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LOOKING BACK: DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA V. HELLER




At the end of June, the Supreme Court, in a
case called District of Columbia v. Heller,
invalidated the District's ban on the private
ownership of pistols. It did so in the name of
the Second Amendment to the Constitution.
The decision was the most noteworthy of the
Court's recent term. It is questionable in
both method and result, and it is evidence
that the Supreme Court, in deciding
constitutional cases, exercises a
freewheeling discretion strongly flavored
with ideology.
The majority opinion, by Justice Antonin
Scalia, concluded that the original, and
therefore the authoritative, meaning of the
Second Amendment is that Americans are
entitled to possess pistols (and perhaps other
weapons) for the defense of their homes.
Scalia's entire analysis rests on this
interpretive method, which denies the
legitimacy of flexible interpretation
designed to adapt the Constitution (so far as
the text permits) to current conditions. The
irony is that the "originalist" method would
have yielded the opposite result.
The Second Amendment, part of the Bill of
Rights added to the original Constitution in
1791, states: "A well regulated Militia being
necessary to the security of a free State, the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms,
shall not be infringed." In other words: since
a militia, provided that it is well regulated, is
a very good thing for a free state to have, the
federal government must not be allowed to
castrate it by forbidding the people of the
United States to possess weapons. For then
the militia would have no weapons, and an
unarmed militia is an oxymoron.
Politically conscious Americans in the late
eighteenth century feared standing armies,
having fought the British army in the
Revolution, and feared centralized
government (as in Britain); and on both
counts they wanted to make sure that the
states would be allowed to have armed
militias. The federal government could
regulate them but not disarm them. The fear
was that in the absence of such a provision
in the Bill of Rights, the provision in Article
I of the Constitution authorizing Congress to
organize, arm, discipline, and call into
service "the Militia" (a term that embraces
the state militias, because the same
provision reserves the right to train and
officer "the Militia" to the respective states)
would enable Congress to disarm them. That
fear surfaced in the debates over the
ratification of the original Constitution and
was, as Justice John Paul Stevens's
dissenting opinion explains, the motivation
for the Second Amendment.
The text of the amendment, whether viewed
alone or in light of the concerns that
actuated its adoption, creates no right to the
private possession of guns for hunting or
other sport, or for the defense of person or
property. It is doubtful that the amendment
could even be thought to require that
members of state militias be allowed to keep
weapons in their homes, since that would
reduce the militias' effectiveness. Suppose
part of a state's militia was engaged in
combat and needed additional weaponry.
Would the militia's commander have to
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collect the weapons from the homes of
militiamen who had not been mobilized, as
opposed to obtaining them from a storage
facility? Since the purpose of the Second
Amendment, judging from its language and
background, was to assure the effectiveness
of state militias, an interpretation that
undermined their effectiveness by
preventing states from making efficient
arrangements for the storage and distribution
of military weapons would not make sense.
The Court evaded the issue in Heller by
cutting loose the Second Amendment from
any concern with state militias (the
"National Guard," as they are now called).
The majority opinion acknowledges that
allowing people to keep guns in their homes
cannot help the militias, because modem
military weapons are not appropriate for
home defense (most of them are too
dangerous), and anyway the opinion says
that the only weapons the Second
Amendment entitles people to possess are
ones that are not "highly unusual in society
at large." Modem military weapons are
highly unusual in society at large. By
creating a privilege to own guns of no
interest to a militia, the Court decoupled the
amendment's two clauses.
It justified this decoupling by arguing that
the word "people" in the expression "the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms"
(the amendment's second clause) must
encompass more than just militiamen,
because eighteenth-century militias enrolled
only able-bodied free men-a mere subset
of the people of the United States. But
obviously the Framers did not mean to
confer even a prima facie constitutional right
to possess guns on slaves, criminals,
lunatics, and children. The purpose of the
first clause of the amendment, the militia
clause, is to narrow the right that the second
clause confers on the "people."
My analysis to this point has been
"originalist"-and it has led to the opposite
conclusion from that of the majority of the
Supreme Court. It has been a narrow
originalism, like that of Scalia's majority
opinion, because it has ignored the
interpretive conventions of the legal culture
in which the Second Amendment was
drafted and ratified. The reigning theory of
legislative interpretation in the eighteenth
century was loose (or flexible, or nonliteral)
construction. This is explicit in William
Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of
England, on which the majority opinion in
Heller ironically relies. In the Commentaries
we read that a medieval law of Bologna
stating that "whoever drew blood in the
streets should be punished with the utmost
severity" should not be interpreted to make
punishable a surgeon "who opened the vein
of a person that fell down in the street with a
fit." Blackstone explained that "the fairest
and most rational method to interpret the
will of the legislator, is by exploring his
intentions at the time when the law was
made, by signs the most natural and
probable. And these signs are either the
words, the context, the subject matter, the
effects and consequence, or the spirit and
reason of the law. . . . As to the effects and
consequence, the rule is, where words bear
either none, or a very absurd signification, if
literally understood, we must a little deviate
from the received sense of them" (emphasis
added). John Marshall, the greatest Supreme
Court justice of the generation that wrote the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights, was also
a loose constructionist.
Originalism without the interpretive theory
that the Framers and the ratifiers of the
Constitution expected the courts to use in
construing constitutional provisions is faux
originalism. True originalism licenses loose
construction. And loose construction is
especially appropriate for interpreting a
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constitutional provision ratified more than
two centuries ago, dealing with a subject
that has been transformed in the intervening
period by social and technological change,
including urbanization and a revolution in
warfare and weaponry.
The Framers of the Bill of Rights could not
have been thinking of the crime problem in
the large crime-ridden metropolises of
twenty-first-century America, and it is
unlikely that they intended to freeze
American government two centuries hence
at their eighteenth-century level of
understanding. Because of the difficulty of
amending the Constitution, it has from the
beginning been loosely construed so as not
to become a straitjacket or a suicide pact.
The older the constitutional provision and
the more the environment has changed since
enactment, the more appropriate is the
method of loose construction.
There are few more antiquated constitutional
provisions than the Second Amendment. For
example, the Framers and the ratifiers of the
amendment probably did think that the right
of militiamen to keep and bear arms entitled
them to keep their weapons in their homes.
They were expected to provide the militia's
muskets rather than receive them from a
weapons depot. Back then, moreover, guns
required a lot of upkeep. Without constant
care, they would rust and the powder would
become moist. Storing the guns at a
warehouse would have left many of them
inoperable. To use this "original"
understanding to allow members of the
National Guard to store military weapons
(machine guns, grenades, Hummers, and so
on) would be preposterous, and it is
disclaimed in the majority opinion.
In these and other ways, the Heller decision
is exposed as an example of loose
construction-despite the Court's pretense
of engaging in originalist interpretation (but
again, an originalism stripped of the original
understanding of how a constitutional
provision should be interpreted). Just as
when the Supreme Court, in 1947 in
Adamson v. California, decided in the teeth
of the language of the Fourteenth
Amendment that the amendment
"incorporates" the Bill of Rights, an exercise
of judicial discretion is presented in Heller
as historically determined. The Bill of
Rights was added to the original
Constitution to limit federal power. One
provision of the Bill of Rights forbids
government to deprive persons of life,
liberty, or property without due process of
law. The Fourteenth Amendment contains
an identical due process clause, but directed
against state action. The Court in Adamson
turned historical handsprings to interpret the
Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause
as incorporating-that is, making applicable
to state action-most of the other provisions
of the Bill of Rights. If Heller is applied to
the states, it will be on the authority of
Adamson.
The true springs of the Heller decision must
be sought elsewhere than in the majority's
declared commitment to originalism. The
idea behind the decision-it is not
articulated, of course, and perhaps not even
consciously held-may simply be that
turnabout is fair play. Liberal judges have
used loose construction to expand
constitutional prohibitions beyond any
reasonable construal of original meaning;
and now it is the conservatives' turn.
Another plausible example of payback is the
conservative justices' expansive
interpretation of the free-speech clause of
the First Amendment to limit regulation of
campaign financing.
It is possible that in both the gun control
case and the campaign-finance cases the
justices in the majority, rather than playing
tit for tat, thought the laws they were
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invalidating very dumb, and in the case of
the District of Columbia's ban on possession
of pistols thought the law wimpish and
paternalistic, like requiring bikers to wear
helmets. A law that bans possession of
pistols outright may even be inferior, at least
as a method of controlling crime, to a law
that combines strict permit requirements
with heavy penalties for violating them, or
even to one that simply imposes draconian
penalties on crimes committed with guns.
But judges are not supposed to invalidate
laws merely because, as legislators, they
would have voted against them.
There is an important difference, obvious
but often overlooked, between using loose
construction to prevent making the
Constitution a straitjacket and using it to
make the Constitution a straitjacket. In
Kennedy v. Louisiana, a decision handed
down shortly before Heller, the Supreme
Court held that to execute a person who
rapes a child but does not kill her violates
the cruel and unusual punishments clause of
the Eighth Amendment. That was a loose
construction that tied the hands of the states
and the federal government, and Scalia and
the other conservative justices dissented. But
in Heller it was the liberal justices who were
dissenting from a decision that ties the hands
of the federal government, and of the states,
too, if the Supreme Court decides that the
Second Amendment constrains state as well
as federal government action. Compare
these two cases to the Zelman case, decided
several years ago. There the Court upheld,
against a challenge based on the clause of
the First Amendment that forbids
governmental establishments of religion, the
funneling of public monies to private
schools by means of vouchers that parents
can use to pay for their kids' tuition. Most
private schools are Catholic parochial
schools. The interpretation of the
establishment clause that permitted the use
of public moneys to finance parochial
schools rejected the imposition on
government of a constitutional restraint that
the liberal justices wanted to impose.
Another illuminating contrast to Heller is
the recent Kelo decision. The Supreme
Court held that the just compensation clause
of the Fifth Amendment does not forbid a
state to condemn private property and,
having thus seized it, to turn it over to a
private developer. The decision provoked
outrage by conservatives, who oppose
condemnation because it infringes rights of
private property. They should not have been
outraged. All the Court did was unshackle
government from a potential constitutional
constraint, and by doing so toss the issue
into the political arena. And sure enough, in
the wake of the decision a number of states,
under pressure from property interests,
curtailed their eminent domain powers.
Similarly, had the Supreme Court upheld the
District of Columbia gun ordinance, it
would not have been outlawing the private
possession of guns. It would merely have
been leaving the issue of gun control to the
political process. The popularity of the
decision and its prompt endorsement by both
presidential candidates attests to the political
power of the "gun lobby"; and an unpopular
decision in favor of the government would
actually have strengthened the lobby, just as
Roe v. Wade strengthened the anti-abortion
movement. The proper time for using loose
construction to enlarge constitutional
restrictions on government action is when
the group seeking the enlargement does not
have good access to the political process to
protect its interests, as abortion advocates,
like gun advocates, did and do.
Constitutional interpretations that relax
rather than tighten the Constitution's grip on
the legislative and executive branches of
government are especially welcome when
there are regional or local differences in
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relevant conditions or in public opinion. The
failure to recognize this point (or perhaps
indifference to it) was the mistake that the
Supreme Court made when it nationalized
abortion rights in Roe v. Wade. It would be
the mistake the Court would be making in
the unlikely event that it created a federal
constitutional right of homosexual marriage.
It is the mistake the Court has made in
Heller. The differences in attitudes toward
private ownership of pistols across regions
of the country and, outside the South,
between urban and rural areas, are profound
(mirroring the national diversity of views
about gay marriage, and gay rights in
general, as well as about abortion rights). A
uniform rule is neither necessary nor
appropriate. Yet that is what the Heller
decision will produce if its rule is held
applicable to the states as well as to the
District of Columbia and other federal
enclaves.
Heller gives short shrift to the values of
federalism, and to the related values of
cultural diversity, local preference, and
social experimentation. A majority of
Americans support gun rights. But if the
District of Columbia (or Chicago or New
York) wants to ban guns, why should the
views of a national majority control? Is that
democracy, or is it Rousseau's forced
conformity to the "general will"? True, a
member of a national majority can be a
member of a minority within a local area:
gun buffs in Washington, D.C., for example.
But a person who is a member of a local
minority but a national majority can relocate
to a part of the country in which the national
majority rules. A resident of Washington
can move to northern Virginia. This is not to
say that there should be no national rights-
that Mississippi should be permitted to stone
adulterers, or Rhode Island to ban The Da
Vinci Code. But the question of whether to
nationalize an issue in the name of the
Constitution calls for an exercise of
judgment; and when the nation is deeply
divided over an issue to which the
Constitution does not speak with any clarity,
and a uniform national policy would
override differences in local conditions,
nationalization may be premature.
There is a further difference between
constitutional interpretations that permit
government action and ones that forbid it:
only the latter create new business for the
federal courts. Conservatives rightly decry
the enormous expansion in the federal
caseload caused by the aggressive
constitutional rulings of liberal justices in
the 1960s. But if the new rule declared in
Heller is applied to the states, we may see a
similar result, this time engineered by
conservatives; and we will have further
confirmation that the Warren Court liberated
conservative as well as liberal judges from
the constraint of judicial modesty. Every
time a gun permit is denied, the disappointed
applicant will have a potential constitutional
claim litigable in the federal courts.
Justice Scalia was emphatic that the right to
possess a gun is not absolute. He sparred
with Justice Stephen Breyer (who wrote a
separate dissenting opinion) over the
standard to be applied to restrictions on gun
ownership. All that is clear is that an
absolute ban on possessing a pistol is
unconstitutional. The other restrictions that a
government might want to impose are up for
grabs. It may take many years for the dust to
settle-many years of lawsuits that our
litigious society does not need.
Conservatives rightly believe, moreover,
that the efficacy of legally enforceable rights
as an engine for social reform is overrated.
The effects even of such well known and
generally applauded decisions as those
invalidating racial segregation of public
schools and the malapportionment of state
legislatures are uncertain, and may not have
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been, on balance, beneficial. The only
certain effect of the Heller decision-for the
scholarly literature has yet to reach
consensus on the effects of gun-control
laws-will be to increase litigation over gun
ownership.
I cannot discern any principles in the pattern
of the Supreme Court's constitutional
interpretations. The absence of principles
supports the hypothesis that ideology drives
decision in cases in which liberal and
conservative values collide. If loose
construction produces a conservative
limitation on government, most
conservatives will support it and most
liberals will oppose it; and if it produces a
liberal limitation on government, most
liberals and conservatives will switch sides.
The qualification in "most" is important,
though. Scalia has voted to invalidate, on
free-speech grounds, laws forbidding the
burning of the American flag. That is loose
construction-decidedly non-originalist in
the narrow sense of his opinion in Heller-
because burning is not speech; and it is a
loose construction that produces a liberal
outcome. Breyer concurred in a decision that
allowed the Ten Commandments to be
exhibited on the grounds of the Texas
Capitol; and that was a conservative vote
(and the swing vote in the case) by a liberal
justice.
Whatever generated these justices'
uncharacteristic votes in those two cases, it
was not a decision-making method that
prevents the exercise of discretion. Both
justices employ judicial methodologies that
leave them with plenty of running room. In
his dissent in the Zelman case, Breyer
argued that the school voucher system was
unconstitutional because there was a "risk"
that it could create "a form of religiously
based conflict potentially harmful to the
Nation's social fabric." In his dissent in
Heller he reversed the burden, arguing that
the risk that allowing limited gun ownership
in the District of Columbia would lead to
more death and injury from guns was
enough to uphold the District's gun law
against constitutional challenge.
Since Stevens devoted most of his dissenting
opinion in Heller to his own interpretation
of the original meaning of the Second
Amendment, observers may conclude that
the entire Court has now embraced
originalism as the canonical method of
interpreting the Constitution. But this is not
a plausible inference in light of the child-
rapist case of just a few weeks earlier (non-
murdering rapists of adult women were
being executed in the United States as
recently as the 1960s), from which Scalia
dissented. One supposes that Stevens could
not resist meeting the majority on its own
ground, since the text and the history (both
pre- and post-enactment) of the Second
Amendment favor the dissent. Among other
things, professional historians were on
Stevens's side.
Still, his opinion seems to me too dogmatic
(the historical evidence is not as one-sided
as his opinion suggests); and it leaves the
impression that all that divided the two
wings of the Court was a disagreement over
the historical record. That was playing into
Scalia's hands. The majority (and the dissent
as well) was engaged in what is derisively
referred to--the derision is richly deserved-
as "law office history." Lawyers are
advocates for their clients, and judges are
advocates for whichever side of the case
they have decided to vote for. The judge
sends his law clerks scurrying to the library
and to the Web for bits and pieces of
historical documentation. When the clerks
are the numerous and able clerks of
Supreme Court justices, enjoying the
assistance of the capable staffs of the
Supreme Court library and the Library of
Congress, and when dozens and sometimes
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hundreds of amicus curiae briefs have been
filed, many bulked out with the fruits of
their authors' own law-office
historiography, it is a simple matter,
especially for a skillful rhetorician such as
Scalia, to write a plausible historical defense
of his position.
But it was not so simple in Heller, and
Scalia and his staff labored mightily to
produce a long opinion (the majority opinion
is almost 25,000 words long) that would
convince, or perhaps just overwhelm, the
doubters. The range of historical references
in the majority opinion is breathtaking, but it
is not evidence of disinterested historical
inquiry. It is evidence of the ability of well-
staffed courts to produce snow jobs.
This is strikingly shown by the lengthy
discussion of the history of interpretation of
the Second Amendment. Scalia quotes a
number of statements to the effect that the
amendment guarantees a personal right to
possess guns-but they are statements by
lawyers or other advocates, including
legislators and judges and law professors all
tendentiously dabbling in history, rather than
by disinterested historians: more law-office
history, in other words. Sanford Levinson, a
distinguished constitutional law professor,
has candidly acknowledged that the most
important reason for his support of a
constitutional right of private possession of
guns is that opposition to this right is
harmful to the electoral prospects of the
Democratic Party.
The statements that the majority opinion
cited had little traction before Heller. For
more than two centuries, the "right" to
private possession of guns, supposedly
created by the Second Amendment, had lain
dormant. Constitutional rights often lie
dormant, spectral subjects of theoretical
speculation, until some change in the social
environment creates a demand for their
vivification and enforcement. But nothing
has changed in the social environment to
justify giving the Second Amendment a new
life discontinuous with its old one: a new
wine in a decidedly old wineskin. There is
no greater urgency about allowing people to
possess guns for self-defense or defense of
property today than there was thirty years
ago, when the prevalence of violent crime
was greater, or for that matter one hundred
years ago. Only the membership of the
Supreme Court has changed.
If constitutional decisions are to be
determined by the balance between liberals
and conservatives on the Supreme Court, the
fig-leafing that we find in Heller-the
historicizing glaze on personal values and
policy preferences-will continue to be
irresistibly tempting to the justices, with
their large and tireless staffs and their
commitment to a mystique of "objective"
interpretation. There is no way to purge
political principles from constitutional
decision-making, but they do not have to be
liberal or conservative principles. A
preference for judicial modesty-for less
interference by the Supreme Court with the
other branches of government-cannot be
derived by some logical process from
constitutional text or history. It would have
to be imposed. It would be a discretionary
choice by the justices. But judging from
Heller, it would be a wise choice. It would
go some distance toward de-politicizing the
Supreme Court. It would lower the
temperature of judicial confirmation
hearings, widen the field of selection of
justices, and enable the Supreme Court to
attend to the many important non-
constitutional issues that it is inclined to
neglect.
Richard A. Posner is a judge for the Seventh
Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals and a
senior lecturer at the University of Chicago.
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When history is pressed through filters of
legal advocacy, what comes out may be very
different, depending, of course, upon the
filter used. The Constitution's Second
Amendment-the one that guarantees "a
right to keep and bear arms"-has a history
that has been examined exhaustively for
generations, and the disagreements over how
to read it have gone on unendingly. Now,
opposite sides in the Supreme Court case
testing the scope and meaning of that
Amendment-the case that comes up for
argument next Tuesday morning-have
taken their turn at reading the history as a
matter of legal advocacy. Not unexpectedly,
James Madison, the primary architect of the
Amendment, is caught in the middle. And
that is but an illustration of the history-the
histories-that have been laid before the
Justices.
When a convention met in Virginia to
consider ratifying the proposed Constitution,
Madison was a delegate. When some
delegates said a new national convention
should be called to change the document, a
committee on which Madison sat tried to
head off that maneuver by offering a list of
40 changes that would be passed along to
the First Congress to consider. One
contained the words "the people have a right
to keep and bear arms" as well as these
words: "a well regulated militia . . . trained
to arms is the proper, natural and safe
defense of a free state." Another proposed
that anyone with religious objections to
"bearing arms" should be allowed to pay
someone else "to bear arms in his stead."
When Madison, in the First Congress, sat
down to draft what would become the
Second Amendment, his draft was to
combine all of those words and phrases into
a composite: "The right of the people to
keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; a
well armed and well regulated militia being
the best security of a free country: but no
person religiously scrupulous of bearing
arms, shall be compelled to render military
service in person."
In the end, these are the words that wound
up in the Amendment: "A well regulated
Militia, being necessary to the security of a
free State, the right of the people to keep and
bear Arms, shall not be infringed."
What does that history show? To the District
of Columbia government and its mayor, that
sequence shows that the Amendment had a
military-only focus. Its brief argues:
"Reading the text of the Second Amendment
as a unified whole to protect only militia-
related firearm rights reflects the concerns
expressed by the Framers from the time of
the Constitutional Convention through
adoption of the Amendment by the First
Congress." The brief goes on to examine
some history from the deliberations in the
First Congress, suggesting that "Madison's
draft was revised to make the Amendment's
exclusively military focus even clearer."
But, starting from some of the same
historical bases, a group named Academics
for the Second Amendment (law professors
who set up their group in 1992 to advocate
an individual rights interpretation) comes
out differently. It agrees that Madison
crafted his initial proposal primarily from
the work of the Virginia ratifying
424
convention's committee. The proposal to
have a right to keep and bear arms and to
recognize a militia as a key to defense, the
Academics say, was intended to embrace a
concept of "essential and inalienable rights
of the people." Another set of the Virginia
proposals discussed distribution of
government power for dealing with military
needs, not rights. Madison, the Academics
contend, wrote his draft from the rights
proposals, not the distribution of power.
They go on to address activity in the First
Congress, noting that the Senate voted down
a proposal to add the military needs idea to
the Constitution-language that, they note,
Madison left out of his draft.
The technique of advocacy in each case-
and this is typical of the other historical
ruminations put before the Court-is to
examine history with some selectivity rather
than comprehensively. Note, in the example
about Madison's choices, that some parts of
the history are the same, but others are not,
yet each points to a conclusion supporting
that side's core argument. That, of course, is
more the method of those with legal skills
than those trained in history's disciplines.
Another example comes in the two sides'
review of the English history that lies behind
the Second Amendment, and the issue at
stake before the Court. Going back to the
Glorious Revolution of 1688 and its early
aftermath, each side sees its perceptions
validated by the English Bill of Rights
accepted by William and Mary. Article VII
guaranteed Protestants that they would have
''arms for their defense suitable to their
condition and as allowed by law."
A group of 15 constitutional historians,
supporting the District of Columbia, reads
that provision as a specific response to the
need to safeguard the Protestant population
and all of England from a restoration of
Catholicism. Moreover, their brief goes on,
Article VII was only a part of a larger
movement to vindicate the supremacy of
Parliament. The historians sum up: "The
liberty Englishmen cherished would be
secured by confirming that a Parliament
respectful of their rights and representative
of society would have sovereign authority to
make law. Article VII endorsed the idea that
well-to-do Protestants might keep arms
against the threat of a Catholic restoration,
but as the formula 'according to law' made
clear, this imposed no limit on the reach of
parliamentary power."
On the other side, Joyce Lee Malcolm, a
professor of legal history at George Mason
Law School and the author of two books on
the English right to arms, goes back to the
same English history in a joint brief she filed
with the Cato Institute. Citing the same
language of Article VII of the English Bill,
the professor and Cato say: "This article set
out a personal right." It was part of a list of
rights that accompanied 12 indictments
against King James II, including one
indictment that accused him of disarming
Protestants. The brief adds: "Neither the
article nor the indictment tied having arms
to militia service, which the Declaration
nowhere mentioned." The brief sums up that
"by the Second Amendment's adoption,
Americans had inherited a broadly
applicable and robust individual right that
had been settled for at least fifty years. This
right of course had limits, but they did not
intrude on the core right to keep firearms to
defend home and family: They confirmed
it."
Much of the disagreement in the legal briefs
in the D.C. gun case focuses on the impact
that guns, and, alternatively, the impact that
gun control laws, have on racial and other
minorities. Again, history is brought to bear
to support the conclusions stated in the two
sides' conflicting briefs.
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For example, the NAACP Legal Defense
Fund notes one historian's argument that a
function of the "well regulated militia" of
the Second Amendment was used during
colonial times and afterward to help
maintain slavery and suppress slave
rebellion. And it argues that the Black Codes
of the post-Civil War Reconstruction era
should not be confused with modem
attempts to control gun laws. Those Codes,
it says, were blatantly discriminatory, but
there is no proof of that in the D.C. gun
ban's history. By contrast, the Congress of
Racial Equality, in a lengthy excursion into
the history of the Black Codes of
Reconstruction days, notes that those
provisions "often prohibited the purchase or
possession of firearms" by freed slaves. It
cites an 1867 report of the Anti-Slavery
Conference concluding that blacks were
"forbidden to own or bear firearms, and thus
were rendered defenseless against assaults."
(One of the authors of the CORE brief is law
professor Robert Cottroll of George
Washington University-who also is cited
as one of the authorities in the brief of the
NAACP LDF.)
On another level, there is strong
disagreement, from a number of former U.S.
attorneys general and other ex-officials in
the Justice Department top echelon, about
what that Department's history says about
the nature of the Second Amendment. One
group, led by former Attorneys General
Janet Reno and Nicholas Katzenbach,
stresses the decades during which their
Department supported the view that the
Amendment did not embrace a private,
individual right-and notes that the
Department put that argument before the
Supreme Court when it last examined the
Amendment's meaning: U.S. v. Miller, in
1939 (which, they recall, was "the first and
only Second Amendment challenge to
federal firearms legislation resolved by this
Court"). But a different group, led by former
Attorneys General Edwin Meese and
William P. Barr, conclude that the
Department's history on the subject did not
"provide well-reasoned, or even consistent,
support" for the view that the Amendment
does not protect an individual right. And
they counter the other ex-officials' citation
to the U.S. brief in the Miller case by noting
that the argument picked out in the other
brief was only an argument alternative to
others that were consistent with an
individual rights view.
Perhaps it was inevitable: the notion that
silence speaks also comes into arguments
about what history has to say (or not).
Eighteen Democratic members of Congress,
for example, cite the Supreme Court's
"decades-long silence" in addressing the
meaning of the Second Amendment as a
reason for the Court now to pay more
attention to what Congress was doing during
that time: passing many laws to impose gun
control without fretting over the Second
Amendment. But, countering that argument,
Vice President Cheney and a majority of the
current members of the House and Senate
examine that period of congressional
activity and find in it repeated instances of
legislative comments supporting the
individual rights theory, including "a
scholarly report" by a Senate subcommittee
in 1968 saying that what the Amendment
protects "is an individual right of a private
citizen to own and carry firearms in a
peaceful manner." And, in its own
suggestion of eloquence in silence, that brief
recites references to an individual rights
theory in pending bills that Congress has not
enacted.
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WASHINGTON-The Supreme Court on
Thursday embraced the long-disputed view
that the Second Amendment protects an
individual right to own a gun for personal
use, ruling 5 to 4 [in District of Columbia v.
Heller, No. 07-290,] that there is a
constitutional right to keep a loaded
handgun at home for self-defense.
The landmark ruling overturned the District
of Columbia ban on handguns, the strictest
gun-control law in the country, and appeared
certain to usher in a new round of litigation
over gun rights throughout the country.
The court rejected the view that the Second
Amendment's "right of the people to keep
and bear arms" applied to gun ownership
only in connection with service in the "well
regulated militia" to which the amendment
refers.
Justice Antonin Scalia's majority opinion,
his most important in his 22 years on the
court, said that the justices were "aware of
the problem of handgun violence in this
country" and "take seriously" the arguments
in favor of prohibiting handgun ownership.
"But the enshrinement of constitutional
rights necessarily takes certain policy
choices off the table," he said, adding, "It is
not the role of this court to pronounce the
Second Amendment extinct."
Justice Scalia's opinion was signed by Chief
Justice John G. Roberts Jr. and Justices
Anthony M. Kennedy, Clarence Thomas and
Samuel A. Alito Jr.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice John Paul
Stevens took vigorous issue with Justice
Scalia's assertion that it was the Second
Amendment that had enshrined the
individual right to own a gun. Rather, it was
"today's law-changing decision" that
bestowed the right and created "a dramatic
upheaval in the law," Justice Stevens said in
a dissent joined by Justices David H. Souter,
Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G.
Breyer. Justice Breyer, also speaking for the
others, filed a separate dissent.
Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens went head
to head in debating how the 27 words in the
Second Amendment should be interpreted.
The majority opinion and two dissents ran
154 pages.
Justice Stevens said the majority opinion
was based on "a strained and unpersuasive
reading" of the text and history of the
Second Amendment, which provides: "A
well regulated militia, being necessary to the
security of a free state, the right of the
people to keep and bear arms, shall not be
infringed."
According to Justice Scalia, the "militia"
reference in the first part of the amendment
simply "announces the purpose for which
the right was codified: to prevent
elimination of the militia." The
Constitution's framers were afraid that the
new federal government would disarm the
populace, as the British had tried to do,
Justice Scalia said.
But he added that this "prefatory statement
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of purpose" should not be interpreted to
limit the meaning of what is called the
operative clause-"the right of the people to
keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed."
Instead, Justice Scalia said, the operative
clause "codified a pre-existing right" of
individual gun ownership for private use.
Contesting that analysis, Justice Stevens said
the Second Amendment's structure was
notable for its "omission of any statement of
purpose related to the right to use firearms
for hunting or personal self-defense," in
contrast to the contemporaneous
"Declarations of Rights" in Pennsylvania
and Vermont that did explicitly protect those
uses.
It has been nearly 70 years since the court
last examined the meaning of the Second
Amendment. In addition to their linguistic
debate, Justices Scalia and Stevens also
sparred over what the court intended in that
decision, United States v. Miller.
In the opaque, unanimous five-page opinion
in 1939, the court upheld a federal
prosecution for transporting a sawed-off
shotgun. A Federal District Court had ruled
that the provision of the National Firearms
Act the defendants were accused of violating
was barred by the Second Amendment, but
the Supreme Court disagreed and reinstated
the indictment.
For decades, an overwhelming majority of
courts and commentators regarded the
Miller decision as having rejected the
individual-right interpretation of the Second
Amendment. That understanding of the
"virtually unreasoned case" was mistaken,
Justice Scalia said Thursday.
He said the Miller decision meant "only that
the Second Amendment does not protect
those weapons not typically possessed by
law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes,
such as short-barreled shotguns."
Justice Stevens said the majority's
understanding of the Miller decision was not
only "simply wrong," but also reflected a
lack of "respect for the well-settled views of
all of our predecessors on the court, and for
the rule of law itself."
Despite the decision's enormous symbolic
significance, it was far from clear that it
actually posed much of a threat to the most
common gun regulations. Justice Scalia's
opinion applied explicitly just to "the right
of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use
arms in defense of hearth and home," and it
had a number of significant qualifications.
"Nothing in our opinion," he said, "should
be taken to cast doubt on longstanding
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by
felons and the mentally ill, or laws
forbidding the carrying of firearms in
sensitive places such as schools and
government buildings, or laws imposing
conditions and qualifications on the
commercial sale of arms."
The opinion also said prohibitions on
carrying concealed weapons would be
upheld and suggested somewhat less
explicitly that the right to personal
possession did not apply to "dangerous and
unusual weapons" that are not typically used
for self-defense or recreation.
The Bush administration had been
concerned about the implications of the case
for the federal ban on possessing machine
guns.
President Bush welcomed the decision. "As
a longstanding advocate of the rights of gun
owners in America," he said in a statement,
"I applaud the Supreme Court's historic
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decision today confirming what has always
been clear in the Constitution: the Second
Amendment protects an individual right to
keep and bear firearms."
The opinion did not specify the standard by
which the court would evaluate gun
restrictions in future cases, a question that
was the subject of much debate when the
case was argued in March.
Among existing gun-control laws, just
Chicago comes close to the complete
handgun prohibition in the District of
Columbia's 32-year-old law. The district's
appeal to the Supreme Court, filed last year
after the federal appeals court here struck
down the law, argued that the handgun ban
was an important public safety measure in a
congested, crime-ridden urban area.
On the campaign trail on Thursday, both
major-party presidential candidates
expressed support for the decision-more
full-throated support from Senator John
McCain, the presumptive Republican
nominee, and a more guarded statement of
support from Senator Barack Obama, his
presumptive Democratic opponent.
Mr. McCain called the decision "a landmark
victory for Second Amendment freedom in
the United States" that "ended forever the
specious argument that the Second
Amendment did not confer an individual
right to keep and bear arms."
Mr. Obama, who like Mr. McCain has been
on record as supporting the individual-rights
view, said the ruling would "provide much-
needed guidance to local jurisdictions across
the country."
He praised the decision for endorsing the
individual-rights view and for describing the
right as "not absolute and subject to
reasonable regulations enacted by local
communities to keep their streets safe."
Unlike the court's ruling this month on the
rights of the Guantanamo detainees, this
decision, District of Columbia v. Heller, No.
07-290, appeared likely to defuse, rather
than inflame, the political debate. The
Democratic Party platform in 2004 included
a plank endorsing the individual-rights view
of the Second Amendment.
The case reached the court as a result of an
assumption by the Cato Institute, a
libertarian organization here, that the time
was right to test the prevailing interpretation
of the Second Amendment. Robert A. Levy,
a lawyer and senior fellow of the institute,
looked for law-abiding district residents
rather than criminal defendants appealing
convictions, to challenge the law.
Mr. Levy, who financed the case, recruited
six plaintiffs. Five were dismissed for lack
of standing. But the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
ruled in favor of one, Dick Anthony Heller.
He is a security guard who carries a gun
while on duty at a federal judicial building
here and was denied a license to keep his
gun at home. The court said Thursday that
assuming Mr. Heller was not "disqualified
from the exercise of Second Amendment
rights," the district government must issue
him a license.
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Reagan's attorney general, Edwin Meese III,
criticized the Supreme Court's decisions and
called on the justices to decide cases based
on the "original intent" of the Constitution.
The justices were wrong to rely on
contemporary views of liberty and equality,
Meese said; instead, they should rely on the
understanding of those concepts in the late
18th century, when the Constitution and the
Bill of Rights were written.
This year the Supreme Court relied more
than ever on history and the original
meaning of the Constitution in deciding its
major cases.
In doing so, however, the court has drawn
criticism from some historians and legal
experts who say the justices' readings of
history were less than scholarly. And the
justices sometimes disagreed sharply on the
historical record, demonstrating that
divining the original meaning of the
Constitution is no small matter.
The term's two most important opinions-
on the reach of habeas corpus in the war on
terrorism, and on the meaning of the 2nd
Amendment-trace the origins of the right
to go to court and the right to "keep and bear
arms" to 17th century England and Colonial
America.
All nine justices agreed that the original
understanding was crucial. However, they
split 5 to 4 in both cases on how to interpret
the history.
In the case of Guantanamo Bay detainees,
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy cited early
English cases in which Spanish sailors and
African slaves petitioned a judge for their
freedom. This suggests that the right of
habeas corpus was not limited to English
subjects, he said. Rather, when this right was
written into the U.S. Constitution in 1787, it
set a basic principle of liberty that protects
people who are captured and held by the
government, including the foreign prisoners
held at Guantanamo, Kennedy said in
Boumediene vs. Bush.
Wrong, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote in
dissent. He said English history showed that
the writ of habeas corpus was limited to
sovereign English territory. It certainly did
not extend to prisoners captured abroad by
soldiers or sailors, he said.
In the other case, District of Columbia vs.
Heller, the justices wrote about 150 pages of
opinion and dissent on whether the 2nd
Amendment was intended to preserve a
"well-regulated militia" in each state or to
protect an individual's right to keep a gun
for self-defense.
Scalia, speaking for a 5-4 majority,
described how the Stuart kings of England
had held power by confiscating the arms of
their opponents. This, in turn, led to their
overthrow and to the English Bill of Rights
of 1689, which said Englishmen "may have
arms for their defense."
Scalia also cited studies by UCLA law
professor Eugene Volokh and others
showing that some Colonial-era state
constitutions spoke of a right "to bear arms
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for the defense of themselves and the state."
This suggests that the right to bear arms
extended beyond service in the state militia.
In dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens said
Scalia was looking in the wrong place.
James Madison, the author of the Bill of
Rights, rejected broader proposals and
focused on preserving "a well-regulated
militia" and a right to "bear arms" in
military service, Stevens contended.
The phrase "bear arms" referred to military
service, he added. In a footnote, he quoted a
judge in the 19th century saying, "A man in
the pursuit of deer, elk and buffaloes might
carry his rifle every day for 40 years, and yet
it would never be said of him that he had
bome arms."
The court's new focus on history drew the
attention-and some snide blog postings-
of legal historians who faulted the justices
for selectively citing cases and writings to
bolster their favored view.
"Neither of the two main opinions in Heller
would pass muster as serious historical
writing," Stanford University historian Jack
Rakove wrote on a blog called
Balkinization.
Neither Scalia nor Stevens is a "competent
historian," University of Texas at Austin
professor Sanford Levinson wrote in another
Balkinization posting. Their work is "what
is sometimes called 'law-office history,' in
which each side engages in shamelessly (and
shamefully) selective readings of the
historical record in order to support what
one suspects are predetermined positions."
Harvard law professor Mark Tushnet, like
Levinson, has studied the 2nd Amendment.
Tushnet wrote that both opinions
"demonstrate why judges shouldn't play
historian."
History is complicated, Tushnet suggested,
but the law requires clear answers, and the
justices "share the natural human tendency
to exaggerate the case that can be made for
the side they ultimately favor."
The court's focus on history went well
beyond those two cases. The justices cited a
series of early shipwreck cases to help
decide whether Exxon could be forced to
pay punitive damages for the 1989 Exxon
Valdez oil spill off Alaska.
"The modem Anglo-American doctrine of
punitive damages dates back at least to
1763," Justice David H. Souter wrote in
Exxon Shipping Co. vs. Baker. He noted that
an ancient forerunner of the notion of
punitive damages is found in a case under
the Code of Hammurabi from Babylon,
which established the principle that the
penalty for stealing a goat was 10 times its
value.
Even a Los Angeles murder case was
decided largely on English history.
Dwayne Giles shot and killed his girlfriend
Brenda Avie in 2002. He claimed self-
defense, but a police officer testified to the
jury that three weeks before the shooting,
Avie said Giles had threatened to kill her.
In Giles vs. California, Scalia said the police
officer's testimony violated the defendant's
right to "confront" the witnesses against
him. Avie was dead and could not testify, so
the judge should not have allowed her words
to be read to the jury, Scalia said, unless
prosecutors could show that Giles killed her
in order to silence her testimony.
According to Scalia, this "doctrine has roots
in the 1666 decision in Lord Morley's case,"
which set the rule that statements of a
missing witness may not be used unless the
witness was "kept away" by the "means or
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procurement" of the defendant. Scalia drew
the lesson that statements to the police may
not be used at a trial unless the defendant
intentionally "procured" the absence of the
witness.
In dissent, Justice Stephen G. Breyer said it
was bizarre to rely on snippets of 17th
century English cases to decide the
Constitution today. "Each year, domestic
violence results in more than 1,500 deaths"
in this country, he said, and there is no good
reason for giving a defendant "a windfall"
for killing the witness against him.
Scalia was appointed to the court by Reagan
in 1986, a year after Meese's speech, and he
advocated a historical approach. Justice
Clarence Thomas, who joined the court in
1991, followed suit. Since the arrival of
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. and Justice
Samuel A. Alito Jr. in the last couple of
years, Scalia has more often found himself
in the position of speaking for the court's
majority rather than firing off opinions in
dissent.
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Whatever side of the Second Amendment
controversy you may be on, the clear winner
in District of Columbia v. Heller (striking
down a Washington, D.C., ban on hand
guns) was intentionalism, the thesis that a
text means what its author or authors intend.
The text in dispute is 27 words long, and it
is cited in the opening pages of each of the
three opinions: "A well regulated Militia,
being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and
bear arms, shall not be infringed." None of
the words in this sentence is esoteric and the
syntax is straightforward; but if textual
simplicity were sufficient to determine
meaning, there would be no reason for 157
pages of close legal and linguistic argument.
What are the justices arguing about? A lot-
the meaning of words, the significance of
documents contemporary to the framing of
the amendment, debates at constitutional
conventions, regulations adopted or not
adopted by various states, the Court's own
precedents-but basically the argument is
about what the framers had in mind. As
Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the
majority, observes, "The two sides in the
case have set out very different
interpretations of the amendment."
But the two sides do not proceed from
different theories of interpretation. Both
agree that the task is to read the amendment
in the light of the purpose the framers would
have had in writing it. They disagree about
what that purpose was, and the materials
they cite are meant to establish a purpose so
firmly that in the light of it the words of the
amendment will have one and only one
obvious meaning.
For Scalia, that meaning is that Americans
have "an individual right to possess a
firearm unconnected with service in a
militia, and to use that arm for traditionally
lawful purposes, such as self-defense within
the home." For Justice John Paul Stevens,
the Second Amendment "was adopted to
protect the right of the people of each of the
several states to maintain a well-regulated
militia," and he finds no "evidence
supporting the view that the amendment was
intended to limit the power of Congress to
regulate the civilian uses of weapons."
The evidence that might satisfy Stevens will
not be found in the amendment itself, for as
the opinions amply demonstrate, the 27
words can be made to bear either
interpretation. Does the first clause of the
amendment govern the second,
propositional, clause and constrain its
meaning (it is only in relation to the desire
to maintain a healthy militia that the right to
bear arms is asserted)? Or does the first
clause only establish a general, pre-existent
condition that does not direct the application
of the second?
Scalia, who holds the latter view, declares
that "a prefatory clause does not limit or
expand the scope of the operative clause."
But in fact it sometimes does and it
sometimes doesn't. A formal, grammatical
analysis will no more settle the matter than
will a lexical analysis. Only by putting a
background intention firmly in place can one
stabilize a text that (like all texts) varies with
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the purpose assigned to it. That is why each
side hears the other's interpretation as
"grotesque" or "strained." Reading within
different assumptions of the framers'
intention, they see different texts and cannot
understand how anyone could miss what is
to each of them so differently clear. Scalia
confidently concludes that nothing in the
Court's precedents "forecloses our adoption
of the original understanding of the Second
Amendment," and he is sure he knows what
that understanding was.
Stevens just as strongly believes that the
evidence he marshals "sheds revelatory light
on the purpose of the amendment" and that
he too knows what that purpose (and
therefore the amendment's meaning ) was.
And yet, while the two jurists come to
different interpretive conclusions, they are
playing the same interpretive game, the
game of trying to figure out what the authors
of the amendment intended by its words.
For a large part of his separate dissenting
opinion, Justice Stephen G. Breyer seems to
be playing another game. He is less
concerned with intention and purpose than
with the problems faced by crime-ridden
urban areas. His question, at least at first, is
not How can we be true to the framers'
intention? but How can we read the
amendment in a way that furthers our efforts
to deal with a serious social problem? He
wants to focus on "the practicalities, the
statute's rationale, the problems that called it
into being, its relationship to those
objectives-in a word, the details." He
identifies as the statute's "basic objective"
the saving of lives and he cites statistics that
establish, he believes, a strong correlation
between the availability of hand guns and
crime. Handguns, he observes, "are involved
in a majority of firearms deaths and injuries
in the United States." And they are also, he
declares, "a very popular weapon among
criminals." He puts particular weight on a
report from a congressional committee that
found handguns "to have a particularly
strong link to undesirable activities in the
District's exclusively urban environment."
If that were all there was to Breyer's
opinion, it would be vulnerable to Scalia's
retort that even if "gun violence is a serious
problem," no mere sociological finding
authorizes or obligates the Court "to
pronounce the Second Amendment extinct."
Where's the link to what the Constitution
says?
Breyer claims to find it in the phrase
"exclusively urban environment," which
allows him to ground his support of the
statute in what at least looks like an
intentionalist argument. The reasoning is
somewhat convoluted because it relies on a
negative. The problem the statute is intended
to redress, he says, is largely urban; but in
thinking about the Second Amendment, the
framers would have been "unlikely . . . to
have thought of a right to keep loaded
handguns in homes to confront intruders in
urban settings," if only because in the
America they knew there were no urban
settings. Therefore they couldn't have had
the intention to disallow a regulation of a
kind they could not have contemplated.
Whether or not this argument is persuasive
as an account of the framers' intention (and
it wasn't persuasive to five of Breyer's
brethren), its intention is clear-to allow
Breyer to present himself as an
intentionalist.
In the end, what we have in District of
Columbia v. Heller is a unanimous decision.
The vote is 5-to-4 on the interpretation of
the amendment's intention, but it's 9-to-O on
the specification of intention as the
interpreter's task.
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Justice Antonin Scalia's majority opinion in
yesterday's Supreme Court decision in
District of Columbia v. Heller is historic in
its implications and exemplary in its
reasoning.
A federal ban on an entire class of guns in
ordinary use for self-defense-such as the
handgun ban adopted by the District of
Columbia-is now off the table. Every gun
controller's fondest desire has become a
constitutional pipe dream.
Two important practical issues remain. First,
will this ruling also apply to states and
municipalities? That will depend on whether
the Supreme Court decides to "incorporate"
the right to keep and bear arms into the 14th
Amendment. But in the middle of his
opinion Justice Scalia acknowledges that the
39th Congress that enacted the 14th
Amendment did so, in part, to protect the
individual right to arms of freedmen and
Southern Republicans so they might defend
themselves from violence.
My prediction: This ruling will eventually
be extended to the states.
Second, how will the court deal with
firearms regulations that fall short of a ban?
The majority opinion strongly suggests that
such regulations must now be subjected to
meaningful judicial scrutiny. The exact
nature of this scrutiny is not clear, but
Justice Scalia explicitly rejects the
extremely deferential "rationality" review
advocated by Justice Stephen Breyer.
Most likely, gun laws will receive the same
sort of judicial scrutiny that is now used to
evaluate "time, place and manner"
regulations of speech and assembly. Such
regulations of First Amendment freedoms
are today upheld if they are narrowly
tailored to achieve a truly important
government purpose, but not if they are
really a pretext for undermining protected
liberties.
My prediction? Because gun-rights groups
like the NRA have so successfully prevented
enactment of unreasonable gun laws, most
existing gun regulations falling short of a
ban will eventually be upheld. But more
extreme or merely symbolic laws that are
sometimes proposed-whose aim is to
impose an "undue burden" by raising the
cost of gun production, ownership and
sale-would likely be found
unconstitutional. All gun regulations-for
example, safe storage laws and licensing-
will have to be shown to be consistent with
an effective right of self-defense by law-
abiding citizens.
Justice Scalia's opinion is exemplary for the
way it was reasoned. It will be studied by
law professors and students for years to
come. It is the clearest, most careful
interpretation of the meaning of the
Constitution ever to be adopted by a
majority of the Supreme Court. Justice
Scalia begins with the text, and carefully
parses the grammatical relationship of the
"operative clause" identifying "the right to
keep and bear arms" to the "prefatory
clause" about the importance of a "well-
regulated militia." Only then does he
consider the extensive evidence of original
meaning that has been uncovered by
scholars over the past 20 years-evidence
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that was presented to the Court in numerous
"friends of the court" briefs.
Justice Scalia's opinion is the finest example
of what is now called "original public
meaning" jurisprudence ever adopted by the
Supreme Court. This approach stands in
sharp contrast to Justice John Paul Stevens's
dissenting opinion that largely focused on
"original intent"-the method that many
historians employ to explain away the text
of the Second Amendment by placing its
words in what they call a "larger context."
Although original-intent jurisprudence was
discredited years ago among constitutional
law professors, that has not stopped
nonoriginalists from using "original
intent"-or the original principles
"underlying" the text-to negate its original
public meaning.
Of course, the originalism of both Justices
Scalia's and Stevens's opinions are in stark
contrast with Justice Breyer's dissenting
opinion, in which he advocates balancing an
enumerated constitutional right against what
some consider a pressing need to prohibit its
exercise. Guess which wins out in the
balancing? As Justice Scalia notes, this is
not how we normally protect individual
rights, and was certainly not how Justice
Breyer protected the individual right of
habeas corpus in the military tribunals case
decided just two weeks ago.
So what larger lessons does Heller teach?
First, the differing methods of interpretation
employed by the majority and the dissent
demonstrate why appointments to the
Supreme Court are so important. In the
future, we should be vetting Supreme Court
nominees to see if they understand how
Justice Scalia reasoned in Heller and if they
are committed to doing the same.
We should also seek to get a majority of the
Supreme Court to reconsider its previous
decisions or "precedents" that are
inconsistent with the original public
meaning of the text. This shows why
elections matter-especially presidential
elections-and why we should vet our
politicians to see if they appreciate how the
Constitution ought to be interpreted.
Good legal scholarship was absolutely
crucial to this outcome. No justice is capable
of producing the historical research and
analysis upon which Justice Scalia relied.
Brilliant as it was in its execution, his
opinion rested on the work of many scholars
of the Second Amendment, as I am sure he
would be the first to acknowledge.
(Disclosure: I joined a brief by Academics
for the Second Amendment supporting the
individual rights interpretation; one of my
articles was cited by Justice Scalia and
another by Justice Breyer in his dissent.)
Due to the political orthodoxy among most
constitutional law professors, some of the
most important and earliest of this
scholarship was produced by nonacademics
like Don Kates, Stephen Halbrook, David
Kopel, Clayton Cramer and others. Believe
it or not, Heller was a case of nearly first
impression, uninhibited by any prior
decisions misinterpreting the Second
Amendment.
Last but not least, tribute must be paid to the
plaintiffs-Shelly Parker, Dick Anthony
Heller, Tom Palmer, Gillian St. Lawrence,
Tracey Ambeau, and George Lyon-who
went where the National Rifle Association
feared to tread, and to their lawyers Robert
Levy, Clark Neily, and lead counsel Alan
Gura. I was privileged to witness Mr. Gura
argue the case-his first Supreme Court
argument ever-and he was outstanding.
Heller provides yet another reminder of the
crucial role that private lawyers play in the
preservation of our liberties.
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In March, for the first time in the nation's
history, a federal appeals court struck down
a gun control law on Second Amendment
grounds. Only a few decades ago, the
decision would have been unimaginable.
There used to be an almost complete
scholarly and judicial consensus that the
Second Amendment protects only a
collective right of the states to maintain
militias. That consensus no longer exists-
thanks largely to the work over the last 20
years of several leading liberal law
professors, who have come to embrace the
view that the Second Amendment protects
an individual right to own guns.
In those two decades, breakneck speed by
the standards of constitutional law, they
have helped to reshape the debate over gun
rights in the United States. Their work
culminated in the March decision, Parker v.
District of Columbia, and it will doubtless
play a major role should the case reach the
United States Supreme Court.
Laurence H. Tribe, a law professor at
Harvard, said he had come to believe that
the Second Amendment protected an
individual right.
"My conclusion came as something of a
surprise to me, and an unwelcome surprise,"
Professor Tribe said. "I have always
supported as a matter of policy very
comprehensive gun control."
The first two editions of Professor Tribe's
influential treatise on constitutional law, in
1978 and 1988, endorsed the collective
rights view. The latest, published in 2000,
sets out his current interpretation.
Several other leading liberal constitutional
scholars, notably Akhil Reed Amar at Yale
and Sanford Levinson at the University of
Texas, are in broad agreement favoring an
individual rights interpretation. Their work
has in a remarkably short time upended the
conventional understanding of the Second
Amendment, and it set the stage for the
Parker decision.
The earlier consensus, the law professors
said in interviews, reflected received
wisdom and political preferences rather than
a serious consideration of the amendment's
text, history and place in the structure of the
Constitution. "The standard liberal
position," Professor Levinson said, "is that
the Second Amendment is basically just read
out of the Constitution."
The Second Amendment says, "A well
regulated militia, being necessary to the
security of a free state, the right of the
people to keep and bear arms, shall not be
infringed." (Some transcriptions of the
amendment omit the last comma.)
If only as a matter of consistency, Professor
Levinson continued, liberals who favor
expansive interpretations of other
amendments in the Bill of Rights, like those
protecting free speech and the rights of
criminal defendants, should also embrace a
broad reading of the Second Amendment.
And just as the First Amendment's
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protection of the right to free speech is not
absolute, the professors say, the Second
Amendment's protection of the right to keep
and bear arms may be limited by the
government, though only for good reason.
The individual rights view is far from
universally accepted. "The overwhelming
weight of scholarly opinion supports the
near-unanimous view of the federal courts
that the constitutional right to be armed is
linked to an organized militia," said Dennis
A. Henigan, director of the legal action
project of the Brady Center to Prevent Gun
Violence. "The exceptions attract attention
precisely because they are so rare and
unexpected."
Scholars who agree with gun opponents and
support the collective rights view say the
professors on the other side may have been
motivated more by a desire to be
provocative than by simple intellectual
honesty.
"Contrarian positions get play," Carl T.
Bogus, a law professor at Roger Williams
University, wrote in a 2000 study of Second
Amendment scholarship. "Liberal professors
supporting gun control draw yawns."
If the full United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit does not
step in and reverse the 2-to-1 panel decision
striking down a law that forbids residents to
keep handguns in their homes, the question
of the meaning of the Second Amendment is
almost certainly headed to the Supreme
Court. The answer there is far from certain.
That too is a change. In 1992, Warren E.
Burger, a former chief justice of the United
States appointed by President Richard M.
Nixon, expressed the prevailing view.
"The Second Amendment doesn't guarantee
the right to have firearms at all," Mr. Burger
said in a speech. In a 1991 interview, Mr.
Burger called the individual rights view
"one of the greatest pieces of fraud-I
repeat the word 'fraud'-on the American
public by special interest groups that I have
ever seen in my lifetime."
Even as he spoke, though, the ground was
shifting underneath him. In 1989, in what
most authorities say was the beginning of
the modem era of mainstream Second
Amendment scholarship, Professor Levinson
published an article in The Yale Law Journal
called "The Embarrassing Second
Amendment."
"The Levinson piece 'was very much a
turning point," said Mr. Henigan of the
Brady Center. "He was a well-respected
scholar, and he was associated with a liberal
point of view politically."
In an interview, Professor Levinson
described himself as "an A.C.L.U.-type who
has not ever even thought of owning a gun."
Robert A. Levy, a senior fellow at the Cato
Institute, a libertarian group that supports
gun rights, and a lawyer for the plaintiffs in
the Parker case, said four factors accounted
for the success of the suit. The first, Mr.
Levy said, was "the shift in scholarship
toward an individual rights view,
particularly from liberals."
He also cited empirical research questioning
whether gun control laws cut down on
crime; a 2001 decision from the federal
appeals court in New Orleans that embraced
the individual rights view even as it allowed
a gun prosecution to go forward; and the
Bush administration's reversal of a
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longstanding Justice Department position
under administrations of both political
parties favoring the collective rights view.
Filing suit in the District of Columbia was a
conscious decision, too, Mr. Levy said. The
gun law there is one of the most restrictive
in the nation, and questions about the
applicability of the Second Amendment to
state laws were avoided because the district
is governed by federal law.
"We wanted to proceed very much like the
N.A.A.C.P.," Mr. Levy said, referring to that
group's methodical litigation strategy
intended to do away with segregated
schools.
Professor Bogus, a supporter of the
collective rights view, said the Parker
decision represented a milestone in that
strategy. "This is the story of an enormously
successful and dogged campaign to change
the conventional view of the right to bear
arms," he said.
The text of the amendment is not a model of
clarity, and arguments over its meaning tend
to be concerned with whether the first part
of the sentence limits the second. The
history of its drafting and contemporary
meaning provide support for both sides as
well.
The Supreme Court has not decided a
Second Amendment case since 1939. That
ruling was, as Judge Stephen Reinhardt, a
liberal judge on the federal appeals court in
San Francisco acknowledged in 2002,
"somewhat cryptic," again allowing both
sides to argue that Supreme Court precedent
aided their interpretation of the amendment.
Still, nine federal appeals courts around the
nation have adopted the collective rights
view, opposing the notion that the
amendment protects individual gun rights.
The only exceptions are the Fifth Circuit, in
New Orleans, and the District of Columbia
Circuit. The Second Circuit, in New York,
has not addressed the question.
Linda Singer, the District of Columbia's
attorney general, said the debate over the
meaning of the amendment was not only an
academic one.
"It's truly a life-or-death question for us,"
she said. "It's not theoretical. We all
remember very well when D.C. had the
highest murder rate in the country, and we
won't go back there."
The decision in Parker has been stayed
while the full appeals court decides whether
to rehear the case.
Should the case reach the Supreme Court,
Professor Tribe said, "there's a really quite
decent chance that it will be affirmed."
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There are two kinds of law, wrote Thomas
Paine in 1805: Legislative law is the law of
the land, enacted by our own legislators,
chosen by the people for that purpose.
Lawyerslaw is a mass of opinions and
decisions which courts and lawyers have
instituted themselves. Paine liked the first
kind of law better. So does Antonin Scalia.
As the most intellectually consistent and
stylistically gifted member of the Supreme
Court, Scalia has never hidden his
enthusiasm for the American tradition of
mistrusting courts and lawyers. The basics
of his judicial philosophy are now usefully
collated in [A Matter of Interpretation,]
which consists of an essay by the associate
justice, followed first by responses from
Gordon Wood, Laurence Tribe, Mary Ann
Glendon, and Ronald Dworkin, and then by
a reply from Scalia.
According to Scalia, the problem begins in
law school, where tomorrow's judges digest
a steady diet of fusty 19th-century English
appellate decisions, and taste-for the first
time-the joys of reasoning by analogy and
precedent. A few of these students befriend
their senators, or find some other way to
become federal judges; by that time, they
have internalized what Scalia calls the
common-law attitude, and they become a
dangerous lot. Faced with an ambiguous
statute or regulation, these judges, reared on
the common law, too often treat the enacted
text as just one more precedent to
circumvent. In other words, they hijack the
democratic process.
Scalia offers two antidotes to this epidemic
of judicial lawmaking: textualism and
originalism. Textualism is just what it
sounds like. As Scalia puts it, The text is the
law, and it is the text that must be observed.
The only democratically binding feature of a
statute is its literal language, because that
language alone has been ratified by both
houses of Congress and the president in
accordance with the Constitution.
Originalism, as Scalia defines it, is a species
of textualism particularly relevant to
constitutional interpretation. Its adherents
tether their interpretations to plain meanings
as they were understood when the text was
first penned. Originalists believe, as Scalia
puts it, that a constitution's whole purpose is
to prevent change-to embed certain rights
in such a manner that future generations
cannot take them away.
None of this is new to anyone who has paid
attention to Scalia's opinions and other
writings over the past decade. Yet, in A
Matter of Interpretation, his reprise of the
traditional jeremiad against judicial
usurpation concludes with a twist. The
specter raised by common-law judging,
Scalia says, is not the unelected judge
determined to impose the values of an elite
few upon the masses, but that old
Tocquevillian villain, the tyranny of the
majority. Scalia's argument goes like this:
As judges persist in bending the law, the
majority of the moment will begin to insist
ever more stridently on judges of its
particular ideological stripe. Once on the
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bench, these judicial politicians
(emboldened by their anything-goes
common-law attitudes) will set about
encoding the popular will into law, to the
detriment of unpopular minorities.
As law Professor Mary Ann Glendon points
out in her response, this is an odd coda,
especially given the majoritarian premises of
Scalia's philosophy. (Glendon shares
Scalia's distrust of undisciplined judges, but
hers is the more traditional anxiety, rooted in
a fear of elites.) At the end of the book,
Scalia, defending his prediction that judges
will carry democracy too far, contends that
the individual rights favored by judges tend
to be the same ones championed by popular
majorities. Here is Scalia's list: women's
rights, racial-minority rights, homosexual
rights, abortion rights, and rights against
political favoritism. Scalia's notion of what
constitutes a popular cause does seem
questionable-racial-minority and gay rights
are not nearly as universally supported as
Scalia seems to think they are. His
nightmare scenario is also far-fetched: Life-
tenured judges are dubious vehicles for
implementing a popular will that changes
from moment to moment. Besides, judges
can't be relied on: Supreme Court justices,
for instance, are famous for disappointing
their appointers.
Scalia's prescriptions have long drawn fire
from legal academics. Some of their
criticisms are repeated here by legal
academics Laurence Tribe and Ronald
Dworkin: Scalia's originalism is too glib,
because it doesn't distinguish between what
the Constitution says and what its framers
expected it to do; too malleable, because it
merely substitutes the guesswork of
historians for the musings of moral
philosophers; too value-laden, because it
imputes an anti-evolutionary purpose to the
Constitution. And so on.
Yet, Scalia is refreshingly right in several
particulars. He justifiably laments the virtual
disregard of statutory interpretation in law-
school curricula, where the hoary common-
law case-study method still predominates
despite the fact that most law nowadays
takes the form of statutes and regulations.
Scalia also rightly rejects the use of
legislative history (committee reports and
floor debates) as a guide to divining
lawmakers' intent. Committee reports are
worthless, not only because they lack a
democratic pedigree, but because they are
infinitely pliable. (Scalia quotes Judge
Harold Leventhal's quip that using
legislative history is like looking over the
heads at a cocktail party until you spot your
friends.) And Scalia is right to object to the
caricature of the textualist/originalist judge
as wooden and unimaginative-
nontextualists, after all, can be plenty
wooden and unimaginative themselves.
Admitted nontextualists, incidentally, are
becoming harder and harder to find. Scalia's
plain language approach has certainly
become more popular among his bench
mates. The simplest proof of this is the
remarkable increase in citations to
dictionaries in Supreme Court opinions. A
recent study found that dictionary
definitions were 14 times more likely to
appear in the court's decisions five years
after Scalia's swearing-in than they were
five years before it. (The originalists, of
course, like to dust off old dictionaries-Dr.
Johnson's 1785 edition for the Bill of
Rights, for instance.) This lexicographical
trend won't cure the textualists' reputation
for stiltedness; reading some of these
opinions is like listening to the high-school
valedictorian who inevitably begins, I didn't
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know what to say today, so I looked up the
word "commencement."
Even devotees of the Living Constitution
like Tribe now declare their fidelity to text.
It's surprising that Tribe's essay doesn't
discuss his textualist argument for the
unconstitutionality of Colorado's
Amendment 2, which forbade cities to enact
anti-discrimination ordinances based on
sexual orientation. Citing almost no cases,
Tribe told the Supreme Court that the
Colorado initiative violated the letter of the
Equal Protection Clause because it denied
gays alone the protection of the anti-
discrimination laws. Not an airtight
argument (all anti-discrimination laws pick
and choose among protected classes), but a
cleverly textualist one-and one that seems
to have helped convince a majority of the
court to strike down the amendment, despite
a lack of helpful precedent. (Scalia offered a
different textualist reading of the Equal
Protection Clause, grounding his arch
dissent firmly in majoritarianism-The
Court has mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit
of spite.)
So how often are judges actually as willful
as Scalia claims they are? It still sometimes
happens. Last spring, the 9th U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals found in the Due Process
Clause a constitutional right to physician-
assisted suicide by relying on Plato,
Montaigne, Thomas More, and the Roper
poll. Its decision, which Tribe defended
before the court earlier this month, is almost
certain to be reversed, probably on textualist
grounds. Most of the current textual
infidelity, though, occurs because the
doctrine of stare decisis-which dictates
adherence to precedent-forces today's
judges to live with adventurous Supreme
Court decisions from earlier in the century.
Not surprisingly, Scalia is no big fan of stare
decisis: In his dissents, he often calls upon
the court to scour away layers of encrusted
precedent in order to get at the original
meaning of the underlying text.
How judges interpret statutes and
constitutions is, according to Scalia, a
question utterly central to the existence of
democratic government. That's hard to
dispute. Yet, as Wood-a historian of early
America-shows in his essay, it's also a
question we've been asking since the
colonial era, fitting the answer to the needs
of the moment. The revolution of 1776, for
instance, was fueled in part by the colonists'
resentment of the overweening powers of
royal judges. As early as the 1780s,
however, the pendulum had swung back,
and many Americans looked to the courts to
check the excesses of their legislators. To
Scalia, however, the idea that judicial power
responds to the demands of the time merely
proves that there have always been willful
judges who bend the law to their wishes.
Seen from a historian's perspective, Scalia's
view of the debate over the judiciary does
look a bit Manichaean. But it would be a
mistake to dismiss him for that reason.
Scalia's arguments have shaped the debate
in our time; he has gone a long way toward
changing how judges interpret the letter of
the law. Not all the way-he has not yet
succeeded in building a durable majority on
the court. Does this mean that unpopular
individual rights are in peril? More likely, it
simply goes to show-as do the exchanges
in this stimulating book-that there is more
than one way to read a text.
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"Courtroom Arguments"
The Wall Street Journal
February 4, 1997
John 0. McGinnis
Of all the justices now sitting on the
Supreme Court, Antonin Scalia is perhaps
the most notorious-for his unrelenting
courtroom interrogations, his rhetorically
sharp judicial prose and (not least) his
uncompromisingly conservative ideas. It is
probably fair to say that most professional
court-watchers do not share Justice Scalia's
view of the world-or of the Constitution;
indeed, in much of the popular press he has
become a kind of right-wing caricature. So
we are lucky to have, in book form, an essay
on legal interpretation by Justice Scalia, as
well as a critical review of his entire judicial
corpus. Taken together they present a clearer
picture of the justice and his ideas-and
help to explain why he incites so much
opposition in our current political culture.
In A Matter of Interpretation, Justice Scalia
defends the jurisprudence of originalism,
which requires that judges interpret the
Constitution in accordance with the meaning
of its text at the time it was enacted. He
contrasts originalism with the so-called
Living Constitution, according to which
judges are permitted to update the
Constitution to keep it in tune with their
view of society's current needs.
Justice Scalia recognizes that the "living"
approach gives courts the power to create
law, a power that originated, he shows, in a
monarchical era when individuals were
much more willing to acquiesce in the
judgments of nondemocratic institutions.
The U.S. Constitution, however, is the
product of democratic principles by which
fundamental law is created by the people.
The meaning of the Constitution, he argues,





nowhere to be found in
itself. Certain matters,









The natural temptation of judges to follow
their own inclinations rather than the
dictates of a written text is strengthened,
Justice Scalia argues, by their legal training.
In first-year law courses students are not
only invited to admire the judges who are
the great architects of the common law but
they are challenged, in Socratic dialogue
with their professors, to create the legal rule
that they think will make for a better (i.e.,
"more just") society. It is hard to put aside
the heady experience of working one's will
on the world and become instead a humble
servant of the Framers of the Constitution.
One of the great merits of Justice Scalia's
essay, however, is to show that the
protection of our liberties depends on such
faithful service. If the First Amendment is
expanded beyond its historically rooted
meaning to meet the felt necessities of
today-e.g., if it is interpreted to protect not
only political speech but the "speech" of,
say, nude dancing, as it now does-there is
no reason that it cannot be contracted to
meet the necessities of tomorrow: The
individual rights judges give they can also
take away. Indeed, once people recognize
that judges are inventing rights, they will
take steps to ensure the confirmation of
443
justices who will enforce only those rights
with which the majority agrees, thereby
making the actual set of rights in the
Constitution irrelevant.
A Matter of Interpretation includes
comments on Justice Scalia's essay by four
academics, including Laurence Tribe and
Ronald Dworkin, who argue that the broad
language of many constitutional provisions,
like the Equal Protection Clause, was
intended to be the means by which judges
could express the best of contemporary
moral values. In both his essay and his
response to his commentators, Justice Scalia
projects a sanguine humor through a robust
prose enlivened by sly sallies against what
he sees as the gaps in logic of the opposing
camp. He is anything but the angry justice of
popular myth. Our political discourse has
become so jejune that the natural habits of a
powerful mind-sharp reasoning and
imaginative rhetoric-are mistaken for
petulant temperament.
In Justice Scalia and the Conservative
Revival, Richard Brisbin shows us another
reason why Justice Scalia is unpopular in
certain precincts: In a time of value-
relativism and militant identity politics, he is
the leading exponent of Enlightenment
beliefs. Justice Scalia's jurisprudence, Mr.
Brisbin shows, seeks to protect our property
from bureaucrats, to require that people be
treated as individuals rather than as
representatives of a class or race, and to use
the rule of law as a restraint against disorder
and conflict.
As an advocate of postmodernism and a
proud egalitarian, Mr. Brisbin appears to
deplore these results, but he has the fairness
to acknowledge that Justice Scalia is a
tenacious exponent of the politics of reason
that the Framers bequeathed to us through a
written constitution. Since the romantic
rebellion against the politics of reason is
responsible for most of this century's
political disasters, we should be grateful that
there is at least one such exponent on the
Supreme Court. Would that there were
more.
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JUSTICE BREYER'S ACTIVE LIBERTY




On the first Monday in October, the United
States Supreme Court opened its term under
the gavel of the new Chief Justice, John G.
Roberts Jr., President Bush's first nominee
to the court. In promising that the justices he
appoints "will not legislate from the bench
and will strictly interpret the Constitution,"
Bush has faithfully recited the mantra that
conservatives regularly use to signal their
belief that the Supreme Court should defer
to democratic decision making.
But in fact, conservative justices have
frequently invoked the Constitution in recent
years to strike down laws passed by
representatives of the people, especially
statutes enacted by Congress. At last
month's Senate Judiciary Committee
hearings on the nomination of Samuel A.
Alito Jr., Democrats and Republicans agreed
on little except the view that the court
presided over by Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist had struck down too many of
their own statutes.
For example, the Rehnquist court held
invalid such popular legislation as the Gun
Free School Zones Act, the Violence
Against Women Act and the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act as intrusions by
the federal government upon the powers of
the states. The Rehnquist court also voted to
immunize state governments from federal
lawsuits on issues ranging from patent
infringement to mismanagement of seaports
to discrimination against public employees
on the basis of disability or age.
Each of these cases was decided by a 5-to-4
vote. And in each decision, Justice Stephen
Breyer, appointed to the court in 1994 by
President Clinton, was among the dissenters.
In his clear and elegant new book, Active
Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic
Constitution, based on his 2004 Tanner
lectures at Harvard University (where he
taught before becoming a federal judge),
Breyer offers an extended reflection on why
he would have deferred to Congress and
upheld the statute in each of these and other
cases, as well as why he sometimes finds
statutes trumped by a constitutional right.
For Breyer, the guiding theme in
constitutional interpretation, whether in
upholding statutes or enforcing rights,
should be enabling democracy "a form of
government in which all citizens share the
government's authority, participating in the
creation of public policy." Such democratic
participation is what Breyer means by the
"active liberty" of the book's title. He takes
his cue less from any particular provision of
the Constitution than from the spirit of the
document as a whole, and from Thomas
Jefferson's reminder in the Declaration of
Independence that, in our system,
governments must derive "their just powers
from the consent of the governed."
Yet the fair-minded, balanced and
dispassionate tone of Active Liberty cannot
conceal its startling premise: that self-
professed conservatives who espouse
textualism, originalism and strict
constructionism often produce results that in
fact turn our democratic tradition on its
head. It may come as a surprise to some
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readers to encounter a Clinton nominee-
indeed, one of only six justices appointed to
the court by Democratic presidents in the
past half-century-arguing so powerfully for
"judicial modesty" and "judicial restraint" in
the face of decisions by a court so long
dominated by Republican appointees.
The great strength of Active Liberty lies in
Breyer's detailed application of his general
thesis to particular recent controversies. In
the federalism cases mentioned above, for
example, Breyer would have allowed
Congress to regulate in matters like gun
possession and domestic violence under a
broad reading of the federal commerce
power. This, he explains, is because in
enacting such laws, "the public has
participated in the legislative process at the
national level," and democratic participation
is discouraged when Congress holds
"elaborate public hearings only to find its
legislative work nullified."
Justices like Rehnquist and Sandra Day
O'Connor, who has held state legislative
office, have argued that invalidating such
federal legislation in fact shifts democratic
decision making to the state or local level.
Breyer disagrees. In a passage candidly
criticizing some of the court's recent
decisions as "retrograde," he notes that a
number of decisions made in the name of
states' rights "paradoxically threaten to shift
regulatory activity from the state and local
to the federal level." By telling federal
officials they may not enlist county sheriffs
to check the backgrounds of handgun
purchasers, for instance, the court in effect
forces Congress to expand the "federal
enforcement bureaucracy" in order to
achieve the same ends.
By the same token, Breyer writes
approvingly of court decisions that in his
view advance democratic values against
claims that the statutes in question violate
individual rights. His two main examples are
recent challenges to campaign finance
regulation and race preferences in university
admissions.
Breyer praises the court's 2003 decision in
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission,
in which he joined a 5-to-4 majority
upholding the McCain-Feingold law's limits
on campaign advertisements focused on
special issues and on soft money
contributions. The statute was challenged on
First Amendment grounds. Conceding that
McCain-Feingold interferes with speech,
Breyer argues that such laws also enhance
speech by democratizing "the influence that
money can bring to bear upon the electoral
process." In his view, they "facilitate a
conversation among ordinary citizens that
will encourage their informed participation."
Seeing First Amendment interests on both
sides, he finds that enhancing the active
liberty of speaking together justifies limiting
the negative liberty of each of us speaking as
we please.
Breyer likewise justifies upholding race
preferences in university admissions on the
ground that such policies enhance
democracy. In 2003, in Grutter v. Bollinger,
he joined a 5-to-4 majority rejecting a
challenge to the University of Michigan Law
School's use of racial criteria in admissions.
He acknowledges that different theories of
equality competed in the case, but holds that
democratic values tipped the balance: "a
racially diverse educational environment,"
by diversifying the leaders whom the
university produces, helps to "facilitate the
functioning of democracy" and foster
"effective participation in today's diverse
civil society." The overwhelming majority
of examples in the book come out the same
way: in favor of the choices made by elected
decision makers.
Breyer offers only a few examples that
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would go the other way-invalidating the
work of a political majority in recognition of
a constitutional right. He would favor, for
instance, Nike's right to publicly contest
allegations that it runs sweatshops; a radio
station's right to broadcast an illegally
intercepted recording of union leaders'
threats of violence; and taxpayers' right not
to finance public subsidies to religious
schools. In each of these cases Breyer sees
enforcement of the constitutional right as
serving to strengthen democracy-by
enhancing public debate or preventing
debilitating religious divisiveness.
In this respect, Active Liberty echoes John
Hart Ely's 1980 masterwork, Democracy
and Distrust. Ely argued that judicial
intervention in democratic outcomes could
be justified only if it would make democracy
itself function better. His examples included
allowing oppressed minorities to gain
representation and permitting dissent as a
way to help clear the channels of political
change.
Breyer goes farther than Ely, however, by
applying his theory to statutory as well as
constitutional interpretation. He explains
why it is best to interpret statutes in the light
of testimony before Congress and legislative
history rather than their literal texts: "the
interpretative process" should make "an
effort to locate, and remain faithful to, the
human purposes embodied in a statute."
Here Breyer takes on arguments made by
Justice Antonin Scalia, who has articulated a
very different theory of adjudication. Scalia,
like Breyer a former law professor, set forth
his principles for deciding cases in his 1997
book, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal
Courts and the Law. There Scalia argued
that the rule of law should be a law of rules,
and that reliance on literal text and original
meaning are the only methods that can
prevent judges from descending into
hopeless subjectivity. On the current court,
these arguments are sometimes echoed by
Justice Clarence Thomas.
Breyer offers a methodical rebuttal to such
arguments, taking them seriously but
contending that they are wrong. Clear rules
are often unfair, he argues, as when petty
criminals get life sentences for stealing a
golf club or a videotape under a regime of
"three strikes and you're out." And he
suggests that textualism and originalism
themselves inevitably involve subjective
judicial choices, since the views of the
constitution's framers or the canons of
statutory construction so often point in more
than one direction.
While rejecting originalism and textualism,
Breyer eagerly embraces another
conservative tradition-that of jurists like
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Louis Brandeis,
Harlan F. Stone, Felix Frankfurter and
Learned Hand, to whom he attributes "an
attitude that hesitates to rely upon any single
theory or grand view of law, of
interpretation or of the Constitution," but
relies instead upon a catholic combination of
"language, history, tradition, precedent,
purpose and consequences."
Now, with Samuel Alito succeeding the
retiring Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, it
remains to be seen who will stand at the
center of the court in the future and
command its vote when it is narrowly
divided. With Active Liberty, Stephen
Breyer has offered a theory of democratic
pragmatism that is very likely to play a
powerful role in deciding such
controversies. Everyone interested in the
trajectory of the new Roberts court should
surely read it.
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[Excerpt of a review of Justice Breyer's Active Liberty.]
. . . Many approaches to constitutional
interpretation have been employed or
suggested over the years, some closer than
others to Justice Breyer's. I have already
noted the affinity between his approach and
pragmatism. One approach with even
stronger similarities is the "representation-
reinforcement" idea proposed a generation
ago by John Hart Ely. Ely thought the
Constitution leaves "the selection and
accommodation of substantive values . . .
almost entirely to the political process" and
that the document is "overwhelmingly
concerned, on the one hand, with procedural
fairness. . . , and on the other, with . . .
ensuring broad participation in the processes
and distributions of government." Ely's
theory led him to praise progressive Warren
and Burger Court decisions on
reapportionment, voting rights, criminal
procedure, and desegregation, while
criticizing other decisions that took
substantive issues out of the political
process, including Roe v. Wade. Justice
Breyer could have made his approach
clearer by explaining how and why it differs
from these related approaches. Justice
Breyer compares his position to only one
alternative, which he calls "textualism" as it
applies to statutes and "originalism" as it
applies to the Constitution. This is the
approach most closely associated with his
colleague Justice Scalia. Much hostility to
textualism and originalism is based on an
unrealistically rigid characterization of the
approach, and Justice Breyer's discussion is
no exception. As Justice Breyer describes
the approach, judges should "focus primarily
upon text, upon the Framers' original
expectations, narrowly conceived, and upon
historical tradition" (p. 116). There are,
admittedly, different versions of textualism
and originalism, and this may be an accurate
description of some. But it seems to me that
Justice Breyer's definition misdescribes the
most prominent and attractive version, in
three respects.
First, the definition omits the textualist-
originalist commitment to deference to
present-day enactments of the political
branches. According to most practitioners of
this view, the decisions of the people's
representatives enjoy a presumption of
constitutionality and should be displaced
only when they are demonstrably
inconsistent with prior constitutional
commitments manifested in text, history,
and tradition. Thus, textualist and originalist
judges do not "focus primarily" on text and
history, but "primarily" on the right of the
people to govern themselves through
democratic institutions. If textual and
historical sources are indeterminate, as they
often are, judges are not free to resolve the
ambiguity in favor of their own preferences,
but must defer to the decisions of the
legislature.
Second, I do not agree with Justice Breyer's
assumption that originalist analysis looks to
"narrowly conceived" purposes. The breadth
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or specificity of historical meaning is itself a
historical question, and some provisions,
such as those in the first section of the
Fourteenth Amendment, may be very broad
indeed. No less than any other approach,
textualism-originalism understands that
constitutional principles are not frozen in
time. The task is to apply the moral-political
principles of the Constitution as faithfully as
possible to the circumstances of our day.
Eighteenth-century Framers may not have
thought to apply the First Amendment to
flag burning or the Fourth Amendment to
thermal imaging, but that has not stopped
originalists from doing so.
Third, Justice Breyer does not acknowledge
the importance of precedent to any system
of legal interpretation, including the one he
criticizes. To be sure, judges in the
textualist-originalist camp differ among
themselves regarding the weight to be given
to precedent, just as is true of judges who
employ other approaches. In my opinion, the
doctrine of stare decisis is a weak link in
constitutional theory across the board. All
too often it is employed selectively and
arbitrarily. More on that below. But most
originalist judges recognize the need for a
consistent, coherent doctrine of respect for
settled precedent. As Hamilton wrote in The
Federalist No. 78, following precedents is
"indispensable" to "avoid an arbitrary
discretion in the courts."
Presumably Justice Breyer targets the
textualist-originalist approach because of the
prominence it has achieved in the last few
decades as both a justification for and an
objective constraint on the power of judicial
review. As Justice Breyer explains,
exponents of textualism and originalism
"hope that language, history, tradition, and
precedent will provide important safeguards
against a judge's confusing his or her
personal, undemocratic notion of what is
good for that which the Constitution or
statute demands" (p. 116).
Advocates of this view thus argue that it is
not an ideological position, but one that
safeguards the distinction between law and
politics. Textualist and originalist judges, at
least in principle, will on occasion vote to
uphold laws they deeply disagree with, or to
strike down laws they would favor, because
the basis for constitutional judging (text,
history, tradition, and settled precedent) is
independent of their own preferences. The
same is not true, even in principle, of judges
who believe their responsibility is to
interpret the Constitution in light of their
own best sense of justice, equality, good
consequences, or other normative concerns.
This is not, of course, to say that every judge
claiming to follow a textualist or originalist
approach will do so in an objective manner.
Texts can be misread and history can be
manipulated; judges are human; power
corrupts; and judges may be tempted to twist
the sources to make the cases come out "the
right way." The point is that in principle the
textualist-originalist approach supplies an
objective basis for judgment that does not
merely reflect the judge's own ideological
stance. And when errors are made, they can
be identified as such, on the basis of
professional, and not merely ideological,
criteria. Even in principle, constitutional
interpretation based on the judge's own
assessment of worthy purposes and
propitious consequences lacks that
objectivity.
I hasten to add that few, if any, judges fit the
stereotype of disregarding all law in favor of
their own political preferences. Virtually all
judges recognize a certain degree of
constraint based on text, history, tradition,
and precedent, and give play to their own
values only within the remaining realm of
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discretion. The real points of division relate
to how strictly or loosely judges read the
constraints, and whether in the remaining
gray areas they defer to democratic
judgment or give play to their own
ideological commitments. Justice Breyer
devotes the last full chapter of his book to
explaining why the textualist-originalist
approach is "unsatisfactory." He lodges five
major criticisms of textualism and
originalism: (1) as a historical matter, the
Framers "did not say specifically what
factors judges should take into account when
they interpret statutes or the Constitution"
(p. 117); (2) nontextualist and nonoriginalist
judging does not "necessarily open the door
to subjectivity" (p. 118); (3) "language and
structure, history and tradition . . . often fail
to provide objective guidance in . . . truly
difficult cases" (p. 124); (4) even if
textualist or originalist methods of
interpretation were "more likely to produce
clear, workable legal rules. . . , the
advantages of legal rules can be overstated"
(p. 127); and (5) "textualist and originalist
doctrines may themselves produce seriously
harmful consequences" (p. 129). These are
familiar points, extensively debated in the
literature. What should interest us most,
however, is how they connect to Justice
Breyer's affirmative position. What is the
connection between active liberty and text,
history, tradition, and precedent? Justice
Breyer passingly concedes that textualism
and originalism are "logically consistent
with emphasizing the Constitution's
democratic objectives" (pp. 116-17), but he
does not develop this theme. One would
think that, from the perspective of active
liberty, the connection to the Constitution's
democratic objectives would be the most
important issue. If judges committed to the
promotion of active liberty "insist[] on
interpretations, statutory as well as
constitutional, that are consistent with the
people's will," as Justice Breyer claims (p.
115), we must ask how the people manifest
their will. I suggest that they do so in three
ways: by creating and amending the
Constitution, by developing constitutional
tradition, and by electing representatives
who enact legislation. These correspond to
the three traditional bases for constitutional
interpretation: fidelity to text, respect for
settled understandings, and deference to
current democratic decisions. Far from being
an alternative to interpretation based on text,
history, tradition, precedent, and deference
to democratic decisionmaking, active liberty
provides theoretical support.
First, active liberty explains why it is
essential for judges to pay close attention to
constitutional text and history. The theory of
judicial review is not that judges are more
likely to make good decisions than the
representatives of the people, but that the
Constitution reflects the will of the people
and sets boundaries for the governing
authority of elected officials. The
Constitution is a document with meaning
and purpose, and legitimate interpretation
must take its bearings from that meaning
and purpose. To impute a meaning to the
text that could not have been intended by the
drafters and ratifiers divorces the words of
the Constitution from the source that gives
them authority. Attention to longstanding
practice and tradition, too, serves the end of
active liberty, because practices that have
been adopted by many decentralized
democratic decisionmakers over an extended
period of time, up to and including the
present, provide authoritative evidence of
the popular will. And of course, for reasons
already explained, judicial restraint-the
principle that judges should defer to
democratic decisionmaking-follows from
the principle of active liberty.
Active liberty could also help to provide a
consistent theory of precedent. For all the
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attention to stare decisis in debates over
Supreme Court nominees, political scientists
tell us that, "[o]verwhelmingly, Supreme
Court justices are not influenced by
landmark precedents with which they
disagree." Many of the Court's most
celebrated decisions-Brown v. Board of
Education, for example-involved the
overruling of prior precedents. But it is also
true that many decisions, even some that
were questionable or controversial when
rendered, have become part of the fabric of
American life; it is inconceivable that they
would now be overruled. Examples might
include protection against sex discrimination
under the Equal Protection Clause,
application of the Equal Protection Clause to
the federal government, expansion of the
Commerce Clause to permit federal
regulation of intrastate commercial activity,
or prohibition of gross malapportionment of
state legislative districts. The staying power
of these holdings is not attributable to the
bare fact that the Supreme Court decided
them, for other decisions of equally long
standing remain controversial and subject to
reconsideration. The difference, I think, lies
in the fact of overwhelming public
acceptance. Whatever may have been their
original legal merit, these decisions have
been accepted by the nation. Legislatures do
not pass laws in defiance of these decisions;
commentators do not attack their reasoning
(except as an academic exercise, which
serves a different purpose than provoking
their reconsideration); people have forgotten
they ever were controversial.
This overwhelming public acceptance
constitutes a mode of popular ratification,
which gives these decisions legitimacy and
authority under the theory of active liberty.
Attention to the theory of active liberty thus
may lead in a direction Justice Breyer did
not intend. He set out to describe and defend
an approach to constitutional interpretation
that would not be bound by text, history, and
tradition, but also would not be based solely
on whether the consequences "are good or
bad, in a particular judge's opinion" (p.
120). In many ways, the attempt is
admirable. Justice Breyer's commitment to
judicial restraint, his respect for differing
opinions, his modesty, his practicality, and
his rejection of utopianism are all welcome
additions to the public debate over the role
of the judiciary.
But ultimately, his effort falls short. On the
one hand, he asks judges to place greater
emphasis on effectuating the people's will.
On the other hand, he asks them to give
greater emphasis to purposes and
consequences than to text, history, and
tradition. But in republican government,
text, history, and tradition are the objective
manifestations of the people's will. Justice
Breyer's insistence that active liberty
provides the linchpin for constitutional
interpretation, examined carefully, offers
more support for the approach he criticizes
than for the approach he espouses.
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Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer's
elegant little book [Active Liberty] has
gotten a lot of press. The reason for the buzz
is that the view of constitutional
interpretation that he puts forth directly
challenges the view of the Court's most
outspoken conservative, Justice Antonin
Scalia. Scalia has long argued that his view
of how the Constitution should be
interpreted, which he calls "originalism," is
most consistent with a democratic system of
government and best protects against what
he takes to be "the main danger in judicial
interpretation of the Constitution," namely,
that "judges will mistake their own
predilections for the law" (see Antonin
Scalia, Originalism. The Lesser Evil,
University of Cincinnati Law Review 57/3,
1989). "Originalists" hold that the meaning
of the Constitution should be understood as
fixed. So, for example, the amendments to
the Constitution mean what they meant
when they were ratified, and no more. The
job of a judge is to resolve questions of law
by determining and applying the original
meaning of the constitutional text in
question. Breyer presents a liberal reply to
Scalia and others.
There is much that is compelling in Breyer's
argument, and it is to be hoped that his book
will be widely read. In the end, though, it is
difficult to escape the impression that he has
made matters too easy for himself. Breyer
mostly ignores here the "culture war"
controversies like abortion and gay rights
that currently dominate public discourse
about the Court. In a way, this is all for the
better. With all the Sturm und Drang over
questions of individual rights, questions of
the common good hardly make the papers.
Breyer draws attention to these questions,
and so deserves praise. Nevertheless, he
needs to write another chapter for the second
edition of this book. More precisely, he
needs to explain and justify what his view of
constitutional interpretation implies for the
controversies that divide us.
Ironically, the title of Breyer's book, Active
Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic
Constitution, could serve Scalia just as well
for a book of his own. Breyer and Scalia
share a commitment to what the nineteenth-
century French philosopher Benjamin
Constant called the "liberty of the ancients."
In Breyer's definition, it is "the freedom of
the individual citizen to participate in the
government and thereby to share with others
the right to make or to control the nation's
public acts"-hence Breyer's term "active
liberty." Constant contrasted the liberty of
the ancients with the liberty of the moderns.
To be "modem," in Constant's lexicon, is to
value first and foremost "the enjoyment of
security in private pleasures" (or, "peaceful
enjoyment of private independence"). From
this perspective, "liberty" is the name for
"the guarantees accorded by institutions to
these pleasures." These guarantees have
traditionally included the rule of law;
freedom of expression, association, and
religion; and property and voting rights.
Neither Breyer nor Scalia is in the least
opposed to modem liberty in this sense.
Instead, they both acknowledge that the
Constitution guarantees individual rights.
Both also want to maximize the
opportunities for the people to rule
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themselves, that is, to exercise ancient or
active liberty. Where they part ways is on
the means to this end. To advance active
liberty, Scalia wants judges to limit
themselves to protecting the rights
unambiguously articulated in the
Constitution and leave all else to the will of
the people as expressed by legislators and
other elected officials. In his estimation,
originalism best serves this end. To advance
active liberty, Breyer wants judges to read
the Constitution in light of what he takes to
be the "basic constitutional purpose:
creating and maintaining democratic
decision-making institutions." In his
estimation, originalism in fact risks
"undermin[ing] the Constitution's efforts to
create a framework for democratic
government" by "placing weight upon
eighteenth-century details to the point at
which it becomes difficult for a twenty-first-
century court to apply the document's
underlying values." Countering originalism,
Breyer claims that judges "should recognize
that the Constitution will apply to 'new
subject matter . . . with which the framers
were not familiar."' The job of the judge
then (quoting Learned Hand) is to
"'reconstruct the past solution imaginatively
in its setting and project the purposes which
inspired it."' In Pauline language, the letter
kills, but the spirit gives life; Breyer chooses
life. For him (to use Pauline language once
more) the Constitution is a covenant of a
free people. It is old, but always open to the
new by virtue of its enduring values.
Thus stated, Breyer's view of constitutional
interpretation, exercised by unelected
judges, seems almost to invite the danger
that Scalia fears: that "judges will mistake
their own predilections for the law." Breyer
agrees that judicial "subjectivity" is a
danger, but he vigorously disputes the
charge that rejecting literalism invites
subjectivity, noting that the relevant
constitutional values or purposes "limit
interpretive possibilities." He also disagrees
with Scalia about the "main danger" to be
feared in interpreting the Constitution. For
Breyer, this danger is interpreting the
Constitution in such a way that it no longer
"helps to resolve problems related to modern
government"-thus "we the people" are not
served here and now.
Basically, Breyer's book can be seen as a
development of his impassioned dissent in a
2002 federalism case, Federal Maritime
Commission v. South Carolina State Ports
Authority. He also shows the implications of
his view of constitutional interpretation for
campaign-finance reform and affirmative
action, among other disputed questions.
Still, his case against originalism and for his
own view is clearest and most compelling in
his discussion of federalism, the proper
division of powers among the federal and
state authorities.
The opinion of the Court in Federal
Maritime was written by Justice Clarence
Thomas, another Originalist. The question
before the Court was whether state
sovereign immunity-in particular,
immunity from complaints by private
parties-precludes federal agencies like the
Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) or,
say, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) from adjudicating a private party's
complaint against a state. Under the
Shipping Act, the FMC was granted the
authority to investigate complaints of
violations of the Act. The agency decided to
do so through an adjudicative process
somewhat similar to court proceedings. The
Court ruled against the FMC.
What is interesting about this case is that the
Constitution says nothing one way or
another about administrative adjudications.
For, as Thomas observes, "The framers, who
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envisioned a limited federal government,
could not have anticipated the vast growth
of the administrative state" and did not
anticipate administrative adjudications at all.
So what is the Originalist to do here?
Thomas invokes the rule of an 1890 case,
Hans v. Louisiana, that "the Constitution
was not intended to 'rais[e] up' any
proceedings against the states that were
'anomalous and unheard of when the
Constitution was adopted."' He then notes
"strong similarities" between administrative
adjudications and civil litigation. The
Eleventh Amendment is the key
constitutional text in Thomas's argument.
This amendment, ratified in 1795, stipulates
that "the judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any
suit . . . commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by citizens of
another state. . . ." From here, Thomas's
reasoning to his conclusion can be expressed
in a syllogism: There are strong similarities
between administrative adjudications and
civil litigation. Civil litigation by a private
party against a state is unconstitutional
under the Eleventh Amendment. Therefore,
administrative adjudications by a private
party against a state are unconstitutional
under the Eleventh Amendment.
Decisions like Thomas's in this case raise
the question of whether originalism really
does protect against judicial subjectivity (or,
as it is often called today, "judicial
activism"). One might wonder just how
strong the analogy is between civil litigation
and administrative adjudications. Beside
similarities, there are notable differences.
Further, the text of the Eleventh Amendment
bears explicitly on "the judicial power of the
United States," which executive-branch
agencies like the FMC do not exercise. It
might then be considered strange that
Thomas, an Originalist, extends the scope of
the amendment beyond its plain meaning.
More generally, times having changed since
the eighteenth century, it is no wonder that
an eighteenth-century text would not speak
explicitly to all our questions. In such a case,
originalism, strictly speaking, is useless. The
judge cannot be an Originalist here because
there is no text here to apply. Instead, the
judge must decide what basic purposes
moved the framers. In the end, this is what
Thomas does: he prioritizes the framers' fear
of "encroachments by the federal
government on fundamental aspects of state
sovereignty, such as sovereign immunity."
But why should fear about an overbearing
federal power in the eighteenth century rule
us in the twenty-first? Other purposes might
be claimed to be more central to the
Constitution, which is what Breyer claims.
Two sentences from Breyer's dissent nicely
summarize his argument in Active Liberty:
Even if those alive in the
eighteenth century did not
"anticipate the vast growth of the
administrative state," they did
write a Constitution designed to
provide a framework for
government across the centuries, a
framework that is flexible enough
to meet modem needs. . . . An
overly restrictive judicial
interpretation of the Constitution's
structural constraints (unlike its
protections of certain basic
liberties) will undermine the
Constitution's own efforts to
achieve its far more basic structural
aim, the creation of a
representative form of government
capable of translating the people's
will into effective public action.
As Breyer also observes in his dissent,
restrictive interpretations of federal powers
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threaten the common good. For such
interpretations may undercut "many laws
designed to protect worker health and
safety," including the Clean Air Act, the
Clean Water Act, the Toxic Substances
Control Act, and the Solid Waste Disposal
Act. Thomas's precise aim may be to roll
back the power of the federal government to
what it was before the New Deal-the aim
of advocates of the so-called Constitution-
in-Exile. One way or the other, however, he
cannot claim merely to be applying the
Constitution in its original meaning. In the
Court's recent federalism cases, it is the
originalists who can be accused of being
"activist judges." (That is a development
that senators should ask the current Supreme
Court nominee, Judge Samuel A. Alito,
about.) Still, to reiterate, Breyer needs to
extend his argument.
Originalism has become the rallying cry for
opposition to a series of disputed decisions
since the 1960s over the regulation of
contraception, abortion, and most recently,
homosexual relations. These decisions
include, most important, Griswold v.
Connecticut (1965), Eisenstadt v. Baird
(1972), Roe (1973), Carey v. Population
Services International (1977), Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey (1992), and Lawrence v. Texas
(2003). What all these decisions have in
common is that they find a right nowhere
enumerated in the Constitution: to "marital
privacy," to decide "whether to bear or beget
a child," to terminate a pregnancy, and to
engage in intimate conduct with another
person of the same sex. Since Roe, these
rights have been justified under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, ratified in 1868, which
prohibits a state from depriving "any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law."
Since the late nineteenth century, the Court
has recognized that the Due Process Clause
''guarantees more than fair process," as
former Chief Justice William Rehnquist
wrote in Washington v. Glucksberg (1997).
In other words, it is settled law that the
clause is not only about legal process, but
about what is due to persons in our
democracy. But there, agreement more or
less comes to an end.
For anti-originalists, what is protected by the
Due Process Clause is open to development
as our understanding of what is essential to
liberty evolves. From this perspective, the
Due Process Clause, because of the
generality of its language, is unlike most of
the instructions and prescriptions that we
give in our daily lives. These instructions
typically have a precise and limited purpose.
For example, if I tell my students on
Monday to write a two-page paper for
Friday, the meaning of my utterance on
Friday is the same as it was on Monday.
And it would be silly (if not
incomprehensible) for my students to claim
that its meaning had changed over the
course of the week. Yet, consider the
maxim, "To thine own self be true." If I say
it to somebody today, it is true that, at least
in a sense, its meaning will be the same
thirty years from now as it is today. But I do
not pretend to know what this maxim will
mean concretely for this person thirty years
from now, and it would be silly and in fact
contradictory for me to insist that it must
mean that she do with her life then exactly
what she should do with her life now.
Similarly, according to the anti-originalists,
it would be senseless for the Court to insist
that the Due Process Clause must mean
concretely the same today as it did in 1868.
Further, to insist as much would run counter
to the spirit of the amendment, which after
all was incorporated into the Constitution in
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order to spread what the preamble calls "the
blessings of liberty." Because times have
changed since 1868, so should our
understanding of what is due to persons in
our democracy. In Justice Anthony
Kennedy's words in Lawrence, it must now
be recognized that "liberty presumes an
autonomy of self that includes" not only
"freedom of thought, belief, expression," as
has traditionally been acknowledged, but
''certain intimate conduct," which has come
to be realized only over the past half-
century.
By contrast, for originalists, the claim that
what is protected by the Due Process Clause
is open to development as "our"
understanding of what is essential to liberty
evolves runs counter to the spirit of self-
government in a representative democracy.
In his dissent in Casey, Scalia founds his
opposition to recognizing a right to abortion
on "two simple facts: (1) the Constitution
says absolutely nothing about it, and (2) the
longstanding traditions of American society
have permitted it to be legally proscribed."
Accordingly, "The states may, if they wish,
permit abortion on demand," but they are
not required to do so under the terms of the
Constitution. Instead, he holds that the
question of the permissibility of abortion
ought "to be resolved like most important
questions in our democracy: by citizens
trying to persuade one another and then
voting."
On the questions of abortion and gay rights
(think gay marriage), a strong case can be
made that it is Scalia, not Breyer, who is the
defender and advocate of "active liberty."
(Breyer voted with the majority in
Lawrence.) For it is Scalia who holds that
"we the people" ought to have the right here
to decide what should and should not be
legal. Breyer claims to find "in the
Constitution 's democratic objective . . . a
source of judicial authority and an
interpretive aid to more effective protection
of ancient and modern liberty alike"
(emphasis added). Yet he does not explain
how or why prioritizing "the Constitution's
democratic objective" would result in the
protection of "modern liberty," that is,
freedom from government regulation. To the
contrary, it may seem that giving priority to
the Constitution's democratic objective
would mean a reluctance to extend
individual rights beyond those enumerated
in the Constitution. Breyer also writes that,
"from a historical perspective, one can
reasonably view the Constitution as focusing
upon active liberty, both as important in
itself and as a partial means to help secure
individual (modem) freedom" (emphasis
added). But again, how would promoting
"active liberty"-that is, the liberty of the
ancients-serve as a means to help secure
modem liberty? There are possible answers
to this question-it may be argued, for
example, that refusing to recognize the right
of gay persons to have sexually intimate
relationships demeans and disenfranchises
these persons-but Breyer does not give
any. That is a shame because these answers
need both elaboration and case-by-case
evaluation.
The legal philosopher Joel Feinberg
observed some years ago that originalism
seems to imply "a deep skepticism about the
existence of moral rights." For originalists
refuse to recognize the existence of rights
not explicitly articulated in the Constitution,
as if there were nothing outside of the text.
This is ironic because, judging by the
Declaration of Independence, the founding
fathers and framers of the Constitution
themselves firmly believed that persons
possess moral rights before the institution of
government and its codification in a
constitution. For the Declaration holds it to
be self-evident that government is instituted
in order to secure, among other unnamed
rights, the inalienable rights of life, liberty,
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and the pursuit of happiness. It would then
make sense to read the Constitution, in
particular the Ninth Amendment, as seeking
to protect our rights whether they are named
or not. (The Ninth Amendment reads: "The
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people.") It
can further be observed, though, that the
Court's liberals and libertarians seem to
share a similar skepticism. Consider the
claim in the opinion of the Court in Casey
that "at the heart of liberty is the right to
define one's own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery
of human life." Here a deep skepticism
about truth is made to found our rights in
general and the right to terminate a
pregnancy in particular. So a suggestion:
Maybe what is needed to bring peace, or at
least civility, to our culture wars is that our
jurists become more philosophical again.
We do not want to be ruled by philosopher-
kings, but we should want our Supreme
Court justices to be able to argue in the
highest terms. We should also anticipate the
second, expanded edition of Breyer's book.
Bernard G. Prusak is a Gallen Fellow in the







William H. Rehnquist has died, and John G.
Roberts Jr. has been nominated to replace
him, and another nomination is still to come:
it is an understatement to say that the
Supreme Court is in a period of transition.
The change of personnel is taking place
among conservatives of one kind or another,
according to the wishes of a deeply
conservative president. Yet all this must not
obscure the fact that conservatism on the
Court is about to encounter a serious
challenge. With this small but important
book, [Active Liberty,] Justice Stephen
Breyer emerges as a leading theorist of
constitutional interpretation on the highest
bench in the land. At last there has appeared
a direct and substantial challenge, within the
Court, to the constitutional thought of
Justice Antonin Scalia, who has long offered
an ambitious and forceful account about
how to approach the Constitution and laws
of the United States. For the next decade, I
think, much of the intellectual battle, within
the Court and within the nation, will have to
be conducted with close reference to the
conflict between the starkly different
constitutional theories of Scalia and Breyer.
The impact of President Bush's
appointments notwithstanding, liberalism is
finally, at the level of ideas, pushing back.
Breyer and Scalia begin with a shared
appreciation of the fact that the justices of
the Supreme Court are unelected and serve
for life. Since the Court has the power to
invalidate the decisions of the elected
branches, it is not so easy to reconcile the
magnitude of its power with the national
commitment to democratic self-rule.
Throughout the nation's history, many of the
most prominent constitutional theorists have
tried to resolve this apparent contradiction.
They have argued that if the Court acts in a
certain way, it can coexist comfortably with
democracy after all....
A . . . theory of constitutional interpretation,
espoused most prominently by Scalia and
also favored by Clarence Thomas, is known
as "originalism." Originalists believe that
the Constitution should be interpreted to
mean exactly what it meant at the time that
it was ratified. If the Equal Protection
Clause was originally understood to permit
sex discrimination, then courts should
permit sex discrimination. If the Second
Amendment was originally understood to
forbid gun control, then courts should forbid
gun control. When President Bush praises
''strict construction," many people take him
to be embracing originalism. Originalists
such as Scalia reject Thayer's approach,
because they are quite prepared to strike
down legislation that violates the original
understanding. They are mystified by Ely's
idea of "representation-reinforcing" judicial
review. But originalists, too, prize
democracy. They emphasize that the
Constitution was ratified by "We the
People," who have sovereign authority, and
they want to limit the discretion of federal
judges, who are after all not elected. It is
true that those who ratified the Constitution
are long dead, and this point creates a
substantial problem for originalists; but
democracy is nonetheless central to
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originalist thinking about constitutional law.
As a professor at Harvard Law School,
Stephen Breyer specialized in administrative
law and regulatory policy. Constitutional
law was not his field. As a member of the
Supreme Court, however, Breyer has
gradually been developing a distinctive
constitutional approach of his own, one that
can be seen as directly responsive to Scalia
and originalism. This book announces and
develops that theory. In so doing, it
constitutes a major challenge not only to
Scalia's principles and methods, but also to
the legacy of Rehnquist, with his strongly
conservative inclinations. Appearing when
the Supreme Court is in transition, and when
the national debate about the Court and the
Constitution has degenerated into a war of
slogans, Breyer's timing is uncanny.
Breyer's major theme is "active liberty,"
which he associates with the right of self-
governance. In his own judicial work,
Breyer might indeed be seen as the most
consistently democratic member of the
Rehnquist Court: among its nine members,
he has shown the highest percentage of
votes to uphold acts of Congress and to
defer to the decisions of the executive
branch. But Breyer ... does not believe that
the Court should uphold legislation
whenever the Constitution is unclear. . . .
Breyer wants the courts to take an
aggressive role in some areas, above all in
order to protect democratic governance.
His book comes in three parts. The first
builds on Benjamin Constant's famous
distinction between the liberty of the
ancients and the liberty of the modems. The
liberty of the ancients involves "active
liberty"--the right to share in the exercise of
sovereign power. Quoting Constant, Breyer
refers to the hope that the sharing of that
power would "ennoble" the people's
"thoughts and establish among them a kind
of intellectual equality which forms the
glory and power of a people." But Constant
also prized negative liberty, meaning
"individual independence" from government
authority. In Constant's view, which Breyer
firmly endorses, it is necessary to have both
forms of freedom, and thus "to combine the
two together."
... Breyer claims that the Constitution can
be viewed "as focusing upon active liberty."
He thinks that constitutional interpretation
should be undertaken with close reference to
that central constitutional purpose. In his
account, the Warren Court appreciated
active liberty, and it attempted to make that
form of liberty more real for all Americans.
The Rehnquist Court, by contrast, may have
pushed the pendulum too far back in the
other direction.
So Breyer believes that an appreciation of
the idea of active liberty has concrete
implications for a wide range of modern
disputes, and the second part of his book
traces those implications. He begins with
free speech. An obvious question is whether
the Court should be hostile or receptive to
campaign finance reform. With his eye
directly on the democratic ball, Breyer
suggests that if we focus on the
Constitution's basic structural objective,
"participatory self-government," then we
will be receptive to restrictions on campaign
contributions. A central reason is that such
restrictions "seek to democratize the
influence that money can bring to bear upon
the electoral process." He thinks that some
of his colleagues, most prominently
Rehnquist and Scalia, have been mistaken to
invoke negative liberty as a rigid barrier to
campaign finance restrictions. In the same
vein, he insists that the principle of free
speech, regarded from the standpoint of
active liberty, gives special protection to
political speech, and significantly less
protection to commercial advertising. He
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criticizes his colleagues on the Court for
protecting advertising with such
aggressiveness in recent years. Breyer's
interpretation of freedom of speech
emphasizes democratic self-government
above all.
Affirmative action might seem to have little
to do with active liberty. At first glance, it
poses a conflict between the ideal of color-
blindness and what Breyer calls a "narrowly
purposive" understanding of the Equal
Protection Clause, one that emphasizes the
historical mistreatment of African
Americans. Directly disagreeing with Scalia
and Rehnquist, Breyer tends toward the
narrowly purposive approach. But he also
contends that in permitting affirmative
action at educational institutions, the Court
has been directly concerned with democratic
self-government. The reason is plain: "some
form of affirmative action" is "necessary to
maintain a well-functioning participatory
democracy." Breyer points to the Court's
emphasis on the role of broad access to
education in "sustaining our political and
cultural heritage" and in promoting diverse
leadership. Underlining those points, Breyer
argues that the Court's decision to permit
affirmative action made a direct appeal "to
principles of solidarity, to principles of
fraternity, to principles of active liberty." In
Breyer's view, it should be no surprise that
the Court selected an interpretation of the
Equal Protection Clause that would promote,
rather than undermine, the operation of
democracy.
With respect to privacy, Breyer's emphasis
is on the novelty of new technologies and
the rise of unanticipated questions about
how to balance law enforcement needs
against the interest in keeping personal
information private. Owing to the novelty
and the difficulty of those problems, Breyer
argues for "a special degree of judicial
modesty and caution." He wants to avoid a
''premature judicial decision" that would
risk "short-circuiting, or pre-empting, the
'conversational' law-making process."
Hence his plea is for narrow and careful
judicial rulings that do not lay out long-term
solutions. In Breyer's view, such rulings
serve active liberty, because they refuse to
"limit legislative options in ways now
unforeseeable." By its very nature, a narrow
ruling is unlikely to "interfere with any
ongoing democratic policy debate." His
argument here is important, because other
members of the Court, notably Scalia, have
objected to such narrow rulings on the
ground that they leave too much uncertainty
for the future. For Breyer, such uncertainty
may be a friend of democracy.
... Breyer agrees that the federal system fits
with his general theme, since that system
makes "it easier for citizens to hold
government officials accountable" and
brings "government closer to home"; but he
strongly objects to the Rehnquist Court's
federalism decisions. With respect to
congressional enactments, he observes that
"the public has participated in the legislative
process at the national level," and hence the
principle of active liberty calls for deference
by the Court. Breyer's special target is the
anti-commandeering principle. Speaking in
pragmatic terms, Breyer thinks that this
prohibition precludes valuable initiatives to
protect against terrorism, environmental
degradation, and natural disasters-
initiatives in which, for example, the
national government requires state officials
to ensure compliance with federal standards.
Breyer also contends that an understanding
of active liberty can inform more technical
debates. Consider a prominent example.
Should courts rely only on a statute's literal
text, or should they place an emphasis
instead "on statutory purpose and
congressional intent"? Sharply disagreeing
with the more textually oriented Scalia,
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Breyer favors purpose and intent. He
emphasizes that a purpose-based approach
asks courts to consider the goals of "the
'reasonable Member of Congress'-a legal
fiction that applies, for example, even when
Congress did not in fact consider a particular
problem." Breyer thinks that this approach,
as compared with a single-minded focus on
the literal text, will tend to make the law
more sensible. He also contends that it
"helps to implement the public's will and is
therefore consistent with the Constitution's
democratic purpose." Breyer concludes that
an emphasis on legislative purpose "means
that laws will work better for the people they
are presently meant to affect. Law is tied to
life; and a failure to understand how a
statute is so tied can undermine the very
human activity that the law seeks to
benefit."
The third part of Breyer's book tackles
broader questions of interpretive theory and
directly engages Scalia's contrary view.
Breyer emphasizes that he means to draw
attention to two considerations above all:
purposes and consequences. Constitutional
provisions, he thinks, have "certain basic
purposes," and they should be understood in
light of those purposes and the broader
democratic goals that infuse the Constitution
as a whole. In addition, consequences are
''an important yardstick to ensure a given
interpretation's faithfulness to these
democratic purposes." Breyer is fully aware
that many people, including Scalia and
Thomas, are drawn to "textualism" and its
close cousin "originalism"-approaches that
argue in favor of close attention to the
meaning of legal terms at the precise time
they were enacted. He knows that such
people are likely to think that his own
approach is an invitation for open-ended
judicial lawmaking, in a way that
compromises his own democratic
aspirations. But he has several responses to
such criticisms.
For a start, originalist judges claim to follow
history, but they cannot easily demonstrate
that history favors their preferred method.
The Constitution does not say that it should
be interpreted to mean what it meant when it
was ratified. The document itself enshrines
no particular theory of interpretation. And if
originalism cannot be defended by reference
to the intentions and the understandings of
the Framers, Breyer asks, in what way can it
be defended, "other than in an appeal to
consequences?" He knows that some of the
most sophisticated originalists ultimately
argue that their approach will have good
consequences-for example, by stabilizing
the law and deterring judges from imposing
their own views. So even Breyer's
originalist adversaries are "consequentialist
in an important sense." (Rehnquist himself
never squarely endorsed originalism, but his
votes generally lined up with his originalist
colleagues. His principles of constitutional
interpretation will remain unspecified.)
Breyer also argues that his own approach
does not at all leave courts at sea, for he,
too, insists that judges must take account of
"the legal precedents, rules, standards,
practices, and institutional understanding
that a decision will affect." Those who focus
on consequences will not favor frequent or
dramatic legal change, simply because
stability is important. But the important
point is this: to oppose textualism and
originalism is hardly to oppose the careful
consideration of the Constitution and
statutory law. One of the many services
performed by Breyer's book is that it should
make it difficult, or even impossible, for
critics to caricature the anti-originalist
position. Moreover, textualism and
originalism also cannot avoid the problem of
judicial discretion. Their methods do not
provide quite the unmediated and value-free
inquiry that they imagine. "Which historical
account shall we use? Which tradition shall
we apply?" In the end, Breyer contends that
461
the real problem with textualism and
originalism is that they "may themselves
produce seriously harmful consequences-
outweighing whatever risks of subjectivity
or uncertainty are inherent in other
approaches." His ultimate goal is "a
framework for democratic government" that
will prove workable over time, and he
believes that his kind of purposive approach,
rooted in active liberty, is most likely to
promote that goal.
II.
This is a brisk, lucid, and energetic book,
written with conviction and offering a
central argument that is at once provocative
and appealing. It is not usual for a member
of the Supreme Court to attempt to set out a
general approach to his job; and Breyer's
effort must be ranked among the most
impressive of such efforts in the nation's
long history. For that reason alone, the
appearance of his book is an event of
considerable importance. Scalia has long
been traveling the country, making the
argument on behalf of originalism and
contending that there is no real alternative to
it. Breyer demonstrates that on this point
Scalia is wrong. Moreover, he does so in a
way that is unfailingly civil and generous to
those who disagree with him-and thus
provides a model for how respectful
argument might occur, even on a bench that
has become polarized by unusually hot
rhetoric.
... The textualist Scalia ridicules the resort
to purposes, which, in his view, are often
made up by willful judges. He believes that
an emphasis on text, which is what after all
has been enacted, promotes democratic
responsibility, and also helps to discipline
the judiciary. Textualism itself might easily
be defended with reference to the principle
of active liberty. Perhaps Scalia overstates
the constraints imposed by text, but Breyer
underplays the risk that any judgments about
"reasonableness" will be the judges' own, in
a way that disserves democracy itself. We
may agree that any theory of interpretation
has to be defended in terms of its
consequences; but for interpreting statutes it
is not at all clear that a purpose-based
approach, focusing on consequences in
particular cases, is preferable to a text-based
approach, which asks judges to think little or
not at all about consequences. Textualism
might well lead to better results, all things
considered. None of this means that Scalia's
approach is necessarily superior to Breyer's.
It means only that Breyer has not adequately
engaged the possibility that, on his own
consequentialist grounds, and with an eye on
democratic goals, textualism in the
interpretation of ordinary statutes might be
better than an approach that explores
purposes.
Certainly Breyer does not try to argue, in
originalist fashion, that the actual drafters
and ratifiers of the Constitution wanted to
allow campaign finance reform, restrictions
on advertising, affirmative action programs,
and federal commandeering of state
government. He argues instead that the idea
of active liberty, which animates the
Constitution, helps to justify these
judgments. But exactly what kind of
argument is that? The Framers of the
Constitution also placed a high premium on
"domestic tranquility," to which the
preamble explicitly refers. Would it be right
to say that because domestic tranquility is a
central goal of the document, the president is
permitted to ban dangerous speech? Or that,
if affirmative action threatens to divide the
races in a way that compromises
"tranquility," color-blindness is the right
principle after all? In any event, Breyer
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emphasizes that the Constitution attempts to
protect negative liberty, too. Why shouldn't
a ban on campaign finance restrictions be
seen to follow from that goal? If the answer
lies in the idea of active liberty, why
shouldn't we see campaign finance
restrictions as offending, at once, both forms
of liberty?
Recall that Breyer does not claim that
legislative "purpose" is always something
that can simply be found. "Purpose" is
sometimes what judges attribute to the
legislature, based on their own conception of
what reasonable legislators would mean to
do. If this is true for the purposes of
individual statutes, it is also true for the
purposes of the Constitution as well. When
Breyer asserts that the "basic" purpose of
the Constitution is to protect active liberty,
so as to produce concrete conclusions on
disputed questions, his own judgments about
the goals of a reasonable constitution-maker
are playing a central role in his assertion.
Fortunately, Breyer's own judgments are
reasonable; but he underplays the extent to
which they are his own.
The same point bears on Breyer's
enthusiasm for an inquiry into
consequences. Consequences do matter; but
some of the time it is impossible to assess
consequences without reference to disputed
questions of value. Consider the question of
affirmative action, and suppose, rightly, that
the text of the Constitution could be
understood, but need not be understood, to
require color-blindness. If we care about
consequences, will we accept the color-
blindness principle or not? Suppose we
believe that affirmative action programs
create racial divisiveness and increase the
risk that under-qualified people will be
placed in important positions. If those are
bad consequences, perhaps we will oppose
affirmative action programs. An emphasis
on consequences as such is only a start. To
be sure, Breyer is not concerned with
consequences alone; he wants to understand
them with close reference to purposes,
above all "active liberty." But as I have
suggested, that idea, taken in the abstract, is
compatible with a range of different
approaches to constitutional law. It does not
mandate Breyer's own approach.
None of this means that Breyer is wrong. ...
The problem is that he underplays the
inevitable role of judicial judgments in
characterizing purposes and in assessing
consequences. But no approach to
interpretation can avoid the interpreter's
own judgments. A fuller account than
Breyer has given here would specify the
underlying judgments and attempt to defend
them in far more detail. Such an account
would have to show that courts are both
willing and able to proceed as Breyer
suggests; and it would also have to show
that as compared with alternative
possibilities, a democracy-centered approach
of his preferred sort really would promote
self-government, properly understood.
Active Liberty is a sketch, not a fully
developed argument. But even sketches can
change the way we look at things. With its
modesty, its self-conscious pragmatism, and
its emphasis on the centrality of democratic
goals, Stephen Breyer's approach provides
an eminently reasonable foundation for
constitutional law. It is an approach that
deserves a place of honor in national
debates, now and in the future, about the
role of the Supreme Court in American life.
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COMMENTARY ON THEORIES OF INTERPRETATION
"Justice Grover Versus Justice Oscar: Scalia and Breyer




If judicial confirmation hearings in the
Senate were one-tenth as illuminating as last
night's debate between Supreme Court
Justices Antonin Scalia and Stephen Breyer
at the Capitol Hilton, there would be a
booming market for Supreme Court action
figurines. Co-sponsored by the American
Constitution Society and the Federalist
Society (the Birkenstocks and bow ties of
the legal universe), the debate has Breyer
and Scalia whacking their way through the
possibility of "justice," the limitations of
constitutional history, and, throughout the
evening-the possibility of persuasion.
The justices agree more than they differ, and
they agree about nothing so much as the
extent to which they agree. They agree in
the majority of the cases they decide, and
they agree that "judicial activist" is a stupid
label. They agree that religion cases are hard
and that judicial minimalism is overrated.
Still, when you're sitting close enough to see
that Suprenme Court justices actually wear
socks, their differences are stark. From the
moment he takes the stage, Justice Breyer
looks outward. He shifts in his seat
constantly to catch the eye of the moderator,
ABC's Jan Crawford Greenburg, and then to
make eye contact with individual audience
members. When Scalia speaks, Breyer nods
and bobs. Justice Scalia turns inward,
folding up his arms and gazing raptly into
the middle distance. As Breyer speaks,
Scalia first smirks, then giggles, then sort of
erupts with a rebuttal, usually aimed right at
the tips of his shoes. Where Breyer is ever
striving to connect to the world, Scalia is
happiest in his head. Throughout the debate,
Breyer continues to measure, aloud, whether
he and Scalia are "making progress." Scalia
laughs that Breyer's hopes for the evening
are too high.
Scalia is charming and-as ever-riotously
funny. For each time Breyer says his own
constitutional approach is "complicated" or
"hard," Scalia retorts that his is "easy as pie"
and a "piece of cake." And if this debate
mirrors a marketplace of ideas, Breyer will
make the sale through the earnest personal
connection of a Wal-Mart greeter, while
Scalia opts for the aloof certainty of the
Tiffany's salesman: "Sure, you can buy
some other, cheaper constitutional theory,
but really. Ew."
Each of the justices explains how he
approaches a case: Breyer has six
interpretive tools-text, history, tradition,
precedent, the purpose of a statute, and the
consequences. In his view, it's a mistake to
ignore the last two. Scalia replies that to
look at either the purpose or the
consequence of a statute is to invite
subjectivity and beg the question.
Scalia bristles when Crawford Greenburg
quotes back a line about the "living
Constitution" being "idiotic." "You are
misquoting me," he says. "I was describing
the argument in favor of the living
Constitution-that it's a living organism that
must grow or become brittle and snap." And
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he can't resist adding, "That is idiotic." He
observes that there is a difference between
applying the Constitution to a changing
world-to television and the Internet, say-
and to "morphing" old ideas to mean
precisely their opposite. How could a
Constitution that clearly allowed for the
death penalty now explicitly prohibit it?
"That's the living Constitution I am talking
about, and it's the one I wish would die."
Breyer points out that the constitutional
language of "cruel and unusual" is not clear,
before chuckling, "I was making a lot more
progress before." Breyer describes the job of
justices as patrolling the boundaries-
making certain the legislature doesn't "go
too far" at the margins. The words of the
Constitution "don't explain themselves," he
says. Scalia retorts that the Bill of Rights
itself sets out the limitations on legislatures
and that a majority set out these limitations
when it ratified the Constitution. Those are
the real boundaries, not the boundaries
invented by each new generation of jurists.
Breyer says that if the only thing that
matters is historical truths from the time of
the Constitution, "we should have nine
historians on the court." Scalia says, "It's
not my burden to prove originalism is
perfect. It's just my burden to prove it's
better than anything else." He adds that a
court of nine historians sounds better than a
court of nine ethicists.
The justices enter into a side skirmish over
the high court's religion jurisprudence-a
skirmish that launches Scalia into a delicious
impression of the Frenchman who described
to him the difference between France and
America: "Justice Scalia," he minces,
"France is a country with 300 cheeses and
two religions. The United States is a country
with two cheeses and 300 religions."
Breyer cracks up: "But why does the
Frenchman have an Italian accent?"
Both justices agree the words activist judge
are basically useless. "An insult," says
Breyer. A "conclusory label," says Scalia.
Asked if he ever calls Breyer an activist,
Scalia quips: "I would never call him that to
his face."
Breyer selects Brown v. Board of Education
as a case that was criticized as activist but is
today recognized as a correct application of
the Equal Protection clause. It's an odd
choice in light of the desegregation cases
argued at the court just this week. Brown's
indisputable "correctness" has, after all,
possibly laid the groundwork for its own
demise.
Both justices agree that Chief Justice John
Roberts' affection for narrower, unanimous
cases is probably mistaken: says Scalia, "If
you wanted to decide almost nothing at all
and decide the case on such a narrow ground
that it will be of very little use to the bar in
the future, you can always get nine votes."
He notes that it helps the bar not at all to
have cases decided on narrow technicalities.
Breyer agrees that you don't want nine votes
just to have nine votes. Scalia also disputes
Roberts' distaste for "boldness" in opinion
writing: "The law doesn't have to be dull,"
he grins, explaining that he writes his
dissents for the case books. "Originalism
used to be an orthodoxy," he sighs. "Now,
there are only two certified originalists on
the court, myself and Justice Thomas." He
waves his arm hopelessly at the 900
assembled lawyers. "I don't hope to
persuade you. It's too late for you guys."
But he says he's still hoping to win over the
law students.
Here is where Breyer reveals just how much
these men truly differ. Because, says he, he
writes his dissents to persuade. His cell
phone erupts here. He describes how after
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finishing each dissent, he proclaims to his
wife that "this time it will really persuade
them." He laughs, explaining that over time,
that always changes to a hope that he'll
persuade them and then to regret that it
didn't. Scalia offers the view that nobody at
Supreme Court case conferences is
persuaded by the other justices. Breyer
thinks his colleagues' minds can be changed
with good arguments.
Breyer celebrates the benefits of the many
diverse and contrasting views at the high
court. Scalia mourns the fact that they don't
all share Scalia's views. The discussion is
broad and deep, collegial and frank. And as
we always knew from oral argument, there
are miles and miles separating Scalia's
elegantly simple interpretive worldview
from Breyer's murkier, more hopeful one.
Stephen Breyer's jurisprudential Grover-
sweet and optimistic and eager-to-please-is
working the room, confident he'll sell us on
his constitutional theory, one lawyer at a
time. And Antonin Scalia's constitutional
Oscar the Grouch-frustrated and
misunderstood, yet somehow more lovable
for it-doesn't even try to close the deal. He
doesn't need us to vindicate him. He's
confident history will do that.
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"Alive and Kicking: Why No One Truly Believes




We are all living constitutionalists now. But
only some of us are willing to admit it.
The notion of a Constitution that evolves in
response to changing conditions didn't start
with the Warren Court of the 1960s; it began
at the founding itself. The framers expected
that their language, not their intentions,
would control future generations. They
created, in John Marshall's words, a
"constitution, intended to endure for ages to
come, and consequently, to be adapted to the
various crises of human affairs."
The specific metaphor of a living, evolving
Constitution arose in the 1920s to explain
how a broad view of federal power that
came with World War I (and later, the New
Deal) was consistent with the American
constitutional tradition. The Constitution's
words, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.
wrote in 1920, "called into life a being"
whose "development . . . could not have
been foreseen completely by the most gifted
of its begetters." Hence we must interpret
our Constitution "in the light of our whole
experience and not merely in that of what
was said a hundred years ago."
Holmes was right: The living Constitution is
central to the American constitutional
tradition, so central that even its loudest
critics actually believe in it. Many
Americans fail to realize how much of our
current law and institutions are inconsistent
with the original expectations of the
founding generation. A host of federal laws
securing the environment, protecting
workers and consumers-even central
aspects of Social Security-go beyond the
original understanding of federal power, not
to mention most federal civil rights laws that
protect women, racial and religious
minorities, and the disabled from private
discrimination. Independent federal agencies
like the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal
Trade Commission, and the Federal
Communications Commission would all be
unconstitutional under the original
understanding of the Constitution.
Presidential authority would be vastly
curtailed-including all the powers that the
Bush administration regularly touts. Indeed,
most of the Bush administration's policy
goals-from No Child Left Behind to
national tort reform-would be beyond
federal power.
Conversely, a vast number of civil-liberties
guarantees we now expect from our
Constitution have no basis in the original
understanding. If you reject the living
Constitution, you also reject constitutional
guarantees of equality for women, not to
mention Brown v. Board of Education and
Loving v. Virginia, which struck down laws
banning interracial marriage. Liberals and
conservatives alike would be discomfited.
The original understanding cannot explain
why the Constitution would limit race-
conscious affirmative action by the federal
government, nor does it justify the current
scope of executive power.
Even the Supreme Court's two professed
originalists, Justices Antonin Scalia and
Clarence Thomas, believe in the living
Constitution. Scalia's concurrence in Raich
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v. Ashcroft-this term's medicinal-
marijuana case-demonstrates that he long
ago signed on to the idea of a flexible and
broad national power that came with the
New Deal. And Thomas argues for First
Amendment protections far broader in scope
than the framers would have dreamed of.
Both Justices joined the majority in Bush v.
Gore, which relied on Warren Court
precedents securing voting rights under the
14th Amendment. There was just one tiny
originalist problem with that logic: The
framers and ratifiers of the 14 th Amendment
didn't think it applied to voting.
Nobody, and I mean nobody, whether
Democrat or Republican, really wants to live
under the Constitution according to the
original understanding once they truly
understand what that entails. Calls for a
return to the framers' understandings are a
political slogan, not a serious theory of
constitutional decision-making.
In fact, the contemporary movement for
originalism began as a conservative political
slogan used to attack the Warren Court's
decisions on race and criminal procedure. It
mutated from a concern with the original
intentions of the framers, to the intentions of
the ratifiers, to how the public would have
understood and applied the Constitution's
words at the time they were adopted.
Today's originalism is hauled out to attack
decisions that judges and politicians don't
like. But when it comes to decisions they do
like, or would be embarrassed to disavow,
the same judges and politicians quickly
change the subject. In practice contemporary
originalists pick and choose when they will
demand fidelity to original understanding.
Sometimes they even mangle the history to
get to results they like.
Originalists make two standard objections to
the idea of a living Constitution. The first is
that fidelity to law and a written
Constitution requires fidelity to the original
understanding. Anything else is not legal
interpretation and is per se illegitimate. But
a vast number of existing statutes and
constitutional doctrines are inconsistent with
the original understanding. Why are any of
them law?
Some originalists argue that we should
respect non-originalist precedents only if
lots of people have relied on them. This
doesn't explain why those precedents are
legitimate interpretations according to the
theory; indeed, it suggests that legitimacy
comes from public acceptance of the
Supreme Court's decisions, not from fidelity
to original understanding. Moreover, this
strategy allows originalists to pick and
choose which rulings to keep, based on their
judgments of when reliance is real or
justified. So, strict scrutiny for federal
affirmative action stays, but the right of
privacy goes. We'll keep presidential power
on steroids, thank you, but jettison the
Endangered Species Act.
But there's a more important problem here:
Non-originalist decisions that guarantee race
and sex equality, that protect free speech and
the rights of criminal defendants, and that
give Congress power to protect the
environment and secure equal civil rights are
not unfortunate errors that we are just stuck
with because of "reliance." They are some
of our country's proudest achievements.
There's something deeply wrong with a
theory of constitutional interpretation that
treats some of the key civil rights decisions
of the 2 0 th century as mistakes that we are
stuck with. For if decisions like Brown,
Loving, Craig v. Boren, and Griswold v.
Connecticut are mistakes, we should read
them as narrowly as possible and overturn
them at the first opportunity. But that's not
how Americans regard these decisions. They
are evidence of our gradual progress as a
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nation. They are what make us a country
conceived in liberty and dedicated to the
proposition that all people are created equal.
The great irony is that living
constitutionalism rests on much firmer
jurisprudential foundations. Originalists are
right that the Constitution is binding law, but
they confuse the constitutional text-which
is binding-with original understanding and
original intentions, which are not. A living
Constitution requires that judges faithfully
apply the constitutional text, given the
meanings the words had when they were
first enacted, applying those words to
today's circumstances. Original meaning
does not mean original expected application.
For example, the Constitution bans cruel and
unusual punishments. But the application of
the concepts of "cruel and unusual" must be
that of our own day, not 1791. Living
constitutionalists draw upon precedent,
structure, and the country's history to flesh
out the meaning of the text. They properly
regard all of these as legitimate sources of
interpretation. In fact, most people who call
themselves originalists agree; even they
don't regard original understanding as
controlling in all cases.
Because the basic jurisprudential claim that
original understanding is the only legitimate
method of interpretation is overstated,
originalists usually make a second, more
pragmatic argument: A living Constitution
offers insufficient constraints on judicial
power. The irony of this charge is that in
practice originalism doesn't provide any
greater constraint. As we've seen, originalist
judges pick and choose when to invoke
original understanding and when to rely on
existing precedents they like. Justices Scalia
and Thomas, for example, haven't
acknowledged in their opinions that the
Congress that passed the 14th Amendment
also engaged in affirmative action for
blacks; both have pushed hard for ever-
greater protection of commercial speech
without any evidence of the original
understandings of 1791. If we want
examples of judges just making stuff up to
satisfy their personal predilections, so-called
originalist judges offer plenty of examples.
Originalists are right: Constraining judges is
important. But originalists are looking in the
wrong place. Lower courts are strongly
constrained by previous precedent.
Constraints on the Supreme Court come
from two sources-the professional legal
culture and constitutional structure.
Legal culture demands that arguments
depend on the familiar categories of text,
history, precedent, and structure. These
modalities allow considerable leeway, but
they also genuinely constrain. Even though
the Supreme Court chooses the most
controversial cases, many, if not most, of its
decisions are unanimous or include both
liberals and conservatives in the majority.
The second, and more important,
background constraint on the Supreme Court
comes from the constitutional structures of
American government. Because the court is
a multimember body, centrist judges in each
generation, like Lewis Powell or Sandra Day
O'Connor, determine the path of doctrine,
especially in the most controversial areas. In
addition, new Supreme Court appointments
tend to respond to the vector sum of the
political forces at play at the time of
confirmation. In fact, political scientists
have shown repeatedly that the Supreme
Court never strays too far too long from the
center of the national political coalition, and
when it does, new appointments tend to push
it back in line. The Supreme Court held out
against Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal for a
few years but eventually gave in. The New
Deal settlement, which Justice Scalia
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himself believes in, came from
overwhelming public sentiment in the '20s
and '30s that the Constitution had to be
interpreted in light of the needs of the time;
that ours was a living Constitution.
Since the nation began, critics of the
Supreme Court have argued that judges are
about to take over the country and rule by
fiat. It hasn't happened yet. What critics
don't recognize is this: Checks and balances
built into the system guarantee that the court
rarely opposes the national political
coalition for long, and it usually cooperates
with it. It's a good bet that people who
complain the loudest about the court being
countermajoritarian represent at most a
regional majority, not a national one. People
in the political center usually get pretty
much what they want.
And that brings us to the real secret of why
we have a living Constitution. In the long
run, the Supreme Court has helped secure
greater protection for civil rights and civil
liberties not because judges are smarter or
nobler, but because the American people
have demanded it. When social movements
like the civil rights movement or the
feminist movement convince the center of
the country that their claims are just, the
court usually comes around. Sometimes it
gets ahead of the center of public opinion,
and sometimes it's a bit behind. But in the
long run it reflects the national mood about
the basic rights Americans believe they
deserve. The great engine of constitutional
evolution has not been judges who think
they know better than the American people.
It has been the evolving views of the
American people themselves about what
rights and liberties they regard as most
important to them.
Rather than a set of shackles designed by
long-dead slave-owners, the framers
bequeathed to us a Constitution that could
adapt to the needs and aspirations of each
succeeding generation. Their faith in the
possibilities of the future, and our enterprise
in realizing that future, have made us the
great and free nation we are today.
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"Rethinking Originalism: Original Intent for Liberals




Should constitutional interpreters embrace
the document's original intent or evade it?
Several leading liberal scholars are urging
Americans to choose Door No. 2, because
the original- intent game is doomed to
reach intolerably conservative-indeed,
reactionary-results.
But is it? And once we reject that game,
what are the proper legal rules to play by?
The present moment is a perfect time to
ponder such foundational questions: The
Rehnquist Court is now officially history,
two new justices will soon be in place, and
the Roberts hearings have introduced a new
generation of channel-surfers to detailed
debates about constitutional philosophy.
Closer to home (i.e., the home page of this
Web site), several recent Slate postings by
Jack Balkin, Dahlia Lithwick, and Emily
Bazelon have made interesting contributions
to the original-intent debate.
In late August, Balkin-my Yale colleague
and sometime co-author-correctly pointed
out that Justices Antonin Scalia and
Clarence Thomas, while proclaiming
themselves faithful followers of original
intent, do not always practice what they
preach. For example, these two justices have
consistently voted against affirmative action
but have never explained how their votes
can be squared with historical evidence that
the Reconstruction Congress itself engaged
in affirmative action.
But without more, this is merely an
argument that Scalia and Thomas should be
more consistent and less hypocritical: They
should respect original intent across the
board-at least in the absence of some
compelling legal counterargument, such as
justifiable reliance on past practice or
precedent.
Balkin himself has reached a wholly
different conclusion: Modem constitutional
interpreters, says he, should simply stop
trying to heed the original intent of the men
and women who ratified and amended the
document. In his opinion, interpreters should
focus on the text, not the original intent.
As I see it, text without context is empty.
Constitutional interpretation heedless of
enactment history becomes a pun-game: The
right to "bear arms" could mean no more
than an entitlement to possess the stuffed
forelimbs of grizzlies and Kodiaks. (And if
history no longer constrains, why should
spelling? Maybe the Second Amendment is
about the right to "bare arms" and other
body parts-e.g., nude dancing.)
How about Balkin's argument that
originalism generally leads to outrageously
conservative results? Another leading liberal
light, Cass Sunstein, has said much the same
thing of late. I disagree. The framers
themselves were, after all, revolutionaries
who risked their lives, their fortunes, and
their sacred honor to replace an Old World
monarchy with a New World Order
unprecedented in its commitment to popular
self-government. Later generations of
reformers repeatedly amended the
Constitution so as to extend its liberal
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foundations, dramatically expanding liberty
and equality. The history of these
liberal reform movements-i 9th-century
abolitionists, Progressive-era crusaders for
women's suffrage, 1960s activists who
democratized the document still further-is
a history that liberals should celebrate, not
sidestep.
Consider, for example, the landmark 1954
case of Brown v. Board of Education. Both
Sunstein and Balkin say that Brown broke
with the history underlying the Civil War
amendments, which, they claim, plainly
permitted racial segregation. But the 14th
Amendment, ratified in 1868, undeniably
demanded that government treat blacks and
whites with equal respect, equal dignity, and
equal protection. All Americans-black and
white alike-were proclaimed equal citizens
by that amendment. True, some framers of
this amendment did say that some
segregation laws might be permissible. But
in saying this, many of them were
envisioning a postwar world in which both
races in general might prefer separate spaces
(as most men and women today probably
prefer sex-segregated bathrooms in public
places). In such a world, they believed,
segregation would not always be unequal.
But the Reconstructionists never said that
segregation would always and automatically
be constitutional. The Constitution's text
does not say that all citizens are equal
"except for segregation laws." Rather, it
uncompromisingly demands equality of civil
rights-no ifs, ands, or buts. In fact, most
Reconstructionists understood that a law
whose statutory preamble explicitly
proclaimed whites superior to blacks would
be plainly unconstitutional. The question in
both Plessy v. Ferguson (in 1896) and
Brown v. Board (in 1954) was thus a simple
one, and simpler than these constitutional
scholars might suggest: Was Jim Crow in
fact equal? Or was it instead a law whose
obvious purpose, effect, and social meaning
proclaimed white supremacy in deed rather
than in word? For any honest observer in
either 1896 or 1954, the question answered
itself: Jim Crow was plainly designed to
demean the equal citizenship of blacks-to
keep them down and out-and thus violated
the core meaning of the 14th Amendment.
So, Brown is in fact an easy case for those
who take text and history seriously. (Note,
by the way, that this basic view of Brown-
embraced by a wide range of scholars from
Robert Bork on the right to Charles Black on
the left-is somewhat different than the
more controversial originalist theory
championed by the towering judge/scholar
Michael McConnell, whose ideas Emily
Bazelon has recently explored.)
Another key originalist point that is often
overlooked derives from the 15 th
Amendment, which was ratified two years
after the 14th and reflected a far more robust
vision of black rights, including equal-
suffrage rules. This amendment was
intrinsically integrationist, envisioning a
world in which blacks and whites would
work side by side at the ballot box, in the
jury box, and in legislatures across the
country. As the first Justice Harlan
understood in Plessy (though many modem
scholars seemed to have missed the point
altogether), the enactment history of the 15th
Amendment thus powerfully reinforced
various 14th Amendment arguments against
Jim Crow.
Yes, it's true that on today's court the two
leading originalists are both conservative,
but perhaps the court's most influential
originalist in history was the great Hugo
Black-a liberal lion and indeed the driving
force behind the Warren Court. . . . It's also
worth remembering that the most towering
originalist scholar of the 1970s was also a
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professed liberal, John Hart Ely.
In short, there are many reasons to question
the idea that modem liberals should abandon
constitutional history rather than claim it as
their own. This short posting is not the place
to present all the historical evidence that
some modem anti-originalists are
overlooking-I've tried to do that elsewhere
(in an article in the Harvard Law Review
published in 2000, and, more
comprehensively, in my new book being
published this month). But I hope I've said
enough here to convince thoughtful anti-
originalists to take a second look at the
Constitution's first principles.
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During the hiatus between Supreme Court
confirmation battles, we may as well settle
the clash between the conservative and
liberal approaches to constitutional
interpretation. The battle lines are familiar.
Conservatives, led by Justices Antonin
Scalia and Clarence Thomas, say that the
sole legitimate approach is to follow the
literal text and original meaning of
constitutional provisions and amendments.
Justices' policy preferences should play no
role, assert conservative "originalists." But
the claim is undercut somewhat by the
consistency with which the conservatives'
votes on abortion, religion, race, gay rights,
and many other big issues happen to fit their
policy preferences.
Liberals and many moderates prefer the
"living-Constitution" approach, which has
been dominant at least since the Warren
Court. It involves using ancient but
conveniently vague constitutional phrases to
enforce "evolving standards of decency," to
promote equality, and to vindicate what
sometimes-liberal Justice Anthony Kennedy
likes to call "the right to define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life."
Not surprisingly, constitutional evolution in
the hands of liberals supports liberal
policies.
Each school of thought is most persuasive in
debunking the other. Justice Stephen Breyer
skewers originalism in his 2005 book, Active
Liberty: "Why would the Framers, who
disagreed even about the necessity of
including a Bill of Rights in the
Constitution, who disagreed about the
content of the Bill of Rights, nonetheless
have agreed about what school of
interpretive thought should prove dominant
in interpreting the Bill of Rights in the
centuries to come?"
Even when the original meaning is
undisputed, it is often intolerable to
conservatives as well as liberals. Many
Framers did not see the flogging or even the
execution of a 12-year-old for theft as "cruel
and unusual punishment," for example. And
nothing in the text or original meaning of the
Constitution was designed to bar the federal
government from discriminating based on
race (or sex). This has not stopped Scalia or
Thomas from voting to strike down federal
racial preferences for minorities. Nor have
they hesitated to invoke debatable
interpretations of the Constitution to attack
laws regulating campaign finance and
imposing monetary liability on state
governments.
The living-Constitution approach may be
even more problematic, because it has cut a
wider swath through democratic governance
with even less basis in the written
Constitution.
If the Constitution is an "invitation to apply
current societal values," as Scalia has asked,
"what reason would there be to believe that
the invitation was addressed to the courts
rather than to the legislature? . . . A
democratic society does not, by and large,
need constitutional guarantees to ensure that
its laws will reflect 'current values.'
Elections take care of that."
Consider Roper v. Simmons, last year's
decision barring the death penalty for any
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murder committed before the
birthday. This would have





Justice Kennedy's claim for the 5-4 majority
that modem Americans had reached a
"consensus" that no juvenile murderer
should ever get the death penalty was bogus:
A majority (20) of the 38 states with the
death penalty still allowed such executions.
Kennedy's reliance on the laws of almost all
foreign nations against the juvenile death
penalty was a fig leaf for his personal moral
preferences. So was his twisting of the
relevant literature on juvenile psychology to
suggest misleadingly that minors are
incapable of mature moral reflection. And as
Judge Richard Posner of the federal appeals
court in Chicago points out, Kennedy was
tellingly selective in his attention to social-
science literature: He ignored the studies
suggesting that the death penalty may deter
some would-be killers and thus save lives.
In a variation on the living-Constitution
approach, Breyer argues in Active Liberty
for interpretations designed to promote
"participatory self-government" by voters.
But Breyer's support for the 1973 decision
that ended participatory self-government on
abortion-Roe v. Wade-casts doubt on his
seriousness. Especially since his book does
not even mention this, the biggest and most
controversial decision of the past 60 years.
The bottom line is that nonadherents
understandably see originalism and living
constitutionalism alike as smoke screens for
imposing the justices' personal policy
preferences.
This is not healthy. How might we avoid the
worst excesses of each approach?
The best answer is judicial modesty, in the
sense of great hesitation to second-guess
decisions by other branches of government.
Embraced in general terms by then-Judges
John Roberts and Samuel Alito during their
Supreme Court confirmation hearings, the
judicial-modesty approach is expounded
more fully in a November 2005 Harvard
Law Review article by Posner, a prolific and
ideologically eclectic legal scholar.
Posner begins by puncturing the myth that
judging can ever be completely apolitical. In
constitutional cases, he shows, the Court is
unavoidably "a political body ... exercising
discretion comparable in breadth to that of a
legislature." The most sincere attempt at
"lining up the facts alongside the
constitutional text" usually provides no
more objective a basis for preferring one
outcome to another than for "preferring a
margarita to a cosmopolitan."
Next Posner explains that the justices would
look and act less like political manipulators
if they "acknowledged to themselves the
essentially personal, subjective, and indeed
arbitrary character of most of their
constitutional decisions." Such self-
awareness is rare among justices, Posner
says, because it "would open a
psychologically disturbing gap between their
official and their actual job descriptions."
Instead, "cocooned in their marble palace,
attended by sycophantic staff, and treated
with extreme deference wherever they go,
Supreme Court justices are at risk of
acquiring exaggerated opinions of their
ability and character."
The path of wisdom would be to
acknowledge that "the law made me do it" is
usually no more than a "rationalization for
the assertion of power" of an essentially
political nature, Posner adds. Justices who
understood this would probably be "less
aggressive upsetters of political and policy
apple carts than they are."
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Judicial modesty also converges with a
pragmatic focus on what will be the actual
consequences of a proposed decision. Three
of Posner's examples-cases in which "the
law" did not dictate any particular
outcome-are illustrative.
First, he applauds the 5-4 decision (over a
liberal dissent) in 2002 to allow Cleveland
to finance vouchers enabling low-income
children to leave failed public schools for
mostly Catholic private schools. The major
disputes underlying the case-over whether
the Cleveland experiment would work well
for children and whether it would lead to
sectarian conflict-turned on factual
projections beyond the Court's competence.
"Actual social experiments are necessary to
generate the data needed for intelligent
constitutional rule-making," explains
Posner. "The pragmatist wants to base
decisions on consequences, and it is very
difficult to determine the consequences of a
challenged policy if you squelch it at the
outset."
Second, Posner deplores as "injuriously
unpragmatic" the unanimous 1998 ruling
against President Clinton in the Paula Jones
lawsuit: "It should have been obvious to the
justices that forcing the president to submit
to a deposition in a case about his sexual
escapades would be political dynamite that
would explode and interfere with his ability
to perform his duties."
Third, Posner shows sympathy for Justice
Breyer's solo, split-the-difference approach
in two 5-4 decisions last June involving
displays of the Ten Commandments. In one,
Breyer joined liberals in invalidating the
recent, locally controversial installations of
Decalogue plaques in two Kentucky
courthouses. ("I have no settled view" on
that decision, Posner notes.) In the other,
Breyer joined conservatives in upholding a
Ten Commandments monument on the
grounds of the Texas state Capitol, where it
had stood for 40 years, amid various secular
monuments, with little ado.
Many critics (including me) have faulted
Breyer's hairsplitting for leaving the law
unclear. Not so Posner: "Compromise is the
essence of democratic politics and hence a
sensible approach to dealing with
indeterminate legal questions charged with
political passion. . . . To give a complete
victory to the secular side of the debate (or
for that matter to the religious side) could be
thought at once arrogant, disrespectful, and
needlessly inflammatory."
Amen. Or, if that offends you, right on.
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